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Integrated Modular Avionics, or IMA, has been a notable trend in aircraft avionics for the 
past two decades, promising significant size, weight, and power-consumption (SWAP) 
gains, radically increased sensors fusion, and streamlined support costs. Despite the 
demonstrated success of IMA systems in commercial airliners such as the Airbus A380 
and the Boeing 787, military rotorcraft in the service of the United States Joint services 
have yet to benefit significantly from this technology. At long last, that may be about to 
change. 
The Future Vertical Lift Family of Systems (FVL) initiative was launched in 
2008, with the aim of re-inventing the entire U.S. rotary wing fleet. Within the FVL 
program’s projected timeline, many signs point to the emergence of a second-generation 
IMA technology (IMA2G), which will leverage extensive virtualization and software-
defined functionality to deliver further SWAP gains, fault-tolerance, and system 
capability. Development efforts are indeed already underway to integrate such advanced 
IMA features into the FVL’s Joint Common Architecture.  
This thesis assesses the maturity of IMA2G critical path technologies, validates 
the alignment between IMA2G benefits and desired FVL attributes, and describes the 
operational impact that software-defined avionics and mission systems might have on 
future rotary wing aircraft.   
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A. SOFTWARE-DEFINED AVIONICS AND THE FVL PROGRAM 
The concept of software-defined avionics and mission systems is an emerging 
field with great promise for reducing size, weight, and power-consumption (SWAP), and 
life-cycle costs for modern aircraft, while simultaneously increasing reliability and 
providing new capabilities. It is a natural outgrowth of existing Integrated Modular 
Avionics (IMA) architectures introduced to many production aircraft over the course of 
the last decade, and is often referred to as Second-Generation Modular Avionics 
(IMA2G). First-generation IMA combines many system functions using shared 
processing resources but only makes limited use of virtualization to abstract (and thus 
eliminate) hardware components. Even so, the application of IMA-architecture to such 
aircraft as the Boeing 787 and Airbus A380, has demonstrated the ability to “reduce 
electronic control unit cost, improve the commonality of parts, minimize the number of 
computing modules, and reduce wiring, number of connectors and weight” (Jakovljevic 
& Ademaj, 2013, p. 1). The development of IMA2G is an attempt to continue progress 
along those lines via extensive virtualization and the convergence of critical vehicle 
management functions within a logically partitioned, software-defined, network 
computing environment.  
The promise of second-generation Integrated Modular Avionics has made it an 
attractive avenue of interest for the Department of Defense’s Future Vertical Lift (FVL) 
program. This ambitious initiative seeks to replace the current Army, Navy, Coast Guard, 
and Air Force rotary-wing fleets with an advanced new rotary-wing platform scalable 
from lightweight scout/utility aircraft to ultra-heavy transports (Defense Industry Daily, 
2013). The resulting FVL Family of Systems (FVLFS) will include, manned, unmanned, 
and optionally manned aircraft, and all will share a “common open-systems” avionics 
architecture, intended to allow seamless interoperability (U.S. Department of the Army 
[USA], 2011, p. 1). In short, the FVL program’s Initial Capabilities Documents (ICD) 
describes a sum of characteristics unlike anything flying today, or even on the immediate 
 1 
horizon. It seems reasonable then to propose that the optimum avionics architecture for 
such a system may also be beyond anything flying today.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 The majority of military aircraft in service today with U.S. Joint Forces are 
burdened with heavy, bulky, inefficient and often unreliable avionics and mission-
systems designed under a Federated Architecture Model. The FVL will have to do better, 
if it is to live up to its lofty goals. The ground-up, fleet-wide reinvention of rotary-wing 
aviation proposed by the program is indeed a golden opportunity to break free of present 
limitations—and do so in a cost-effective manner.  
 Though the benefits of pursuing advanced IMA2G architectures in the civil 
aircraft field have been discussed in the literature, application to military systems has 
remained largely unspoken. We seek to address this shortcoming, within the specific 
context of the FVL—which may perhaps be the most significant aircraft-development 
program of the coming decades. 
C. PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER 
 This thesis explores projected benefits of IMA2G and how they align with the 
desired characteristics and capabilities of the DOD’s next-generation helicopter fleet. We 
will also attempt to project upon possible downstream implications (both advantageous 
and otherwise) on FVL operations and support, based on the adoption of IMA2G. The 
intent is to develop a timely and relevant analysis and conclude with recommendations 
for development of FVL’s Joint Common Architecture (JCA).  
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis will focus on answering the following questions:   
• How might software-defined avionics and mission systems help achieve 
key operational requirements listed within the Future Vertical Lift Family 
of Systems ICD? 
• Would an IMA2G-configured FVL Family of Systems be suitable for 
employment as envisioned by the DOD’s concept? 
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• What is the current level of technological risk associated with committing 
to an IMAG2-based systems architecture for FVL? 
• Given the potential impacts, as well as the potential risks, is IMA2G 
(software-defined avionics)—the right fit for the FVL program?  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THIS PAPER 
The analysis of the advanced avionics architectures as applied to the FVL 
program will proceed as follows:  
• Review As-Is state: The Federated Model, IMA.  
• Introduce: IMA2G 
• Survey:  challenges to IMA2G implementation.  
• Introduce: Future Vertical Lift program and proposals 
• Survey: Joint Common Architecture (JCA) – current research directions 
• Findings:  technological maturity/development risk for IMA2G 
• Findings: alignment comparison between IMA2G characteristics and FVL 
desired outcomes. 
• Synthesis and Projection: operational vignette 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. TECHNOLOGIES 
 The history of aircraft avionics may well have begun with a simple lead weight, 
suspended on the end of a short length of cotton twine. This arrangement formed the 
rudimentary turn-and-slip indicator on a 1909 Wright Flyer, and within certain limits, it 
worked well enough (Curran, 1992, p. 7). Over subsequent decades, successive 
generations of technology have provided far more accurate and capable airborne systems, 
but that progress has been accompanied by its own ever-increasing trade-offs. The size, 
weight, power-consumption (SWAP) growth associated with complex, on-board 
equipment logically works in opposition to any efforts at increasing aircraft range, speed 
or payload. In multiple studies, it has also been convincingly correlated with swelling 
unit acquisition-costs (Dryden, Britt, & Binnings-Depriester, 1981), and support/ 
maintenance challenges (USAF Science and Advisory Board [SAB], 2011).   
1. The Scope of the Challenge 
 With the advent of digital technology and integrated circuit microprocessors, the 
focus of aircraft avionics development turned increasingly toward software. A 2009 
NASA report on the increasing complexity of avionics software explains that “in a period 
of forty years, the percent of functionality provided to pilots of military aircraft [through 
software] has risen from 8% in 1960 (F-4 Phantom) to 80% in 2000 (F-22 Raptor) … The 
F-22A is reported to have 2.5 million lines of code” (Dvorak, 2009, p. 30). Despite the 
perception that software is faster and less expensive to develop than commensurately 
complex hardware, this upward-trend in code-derived functionality has done little or 
nothing to arrest costs. According to a paper published in 2009 by Navy analyst Henry 
Eskew, inflation-adjusted fly-away costs for fixed-wing fighter aircraft increased 600% 
from the Korean War vintage F-86 Sabre to the 80’s-delivery F-18C. (Eskew, 2000, 
p. 211)  By the early 1990s, data from contemporary military aircraft acquisition 
programs indicated that up to 50% of program costs were related to avionics. (Curran, 
1992, p. 7). There is no indication that this upward trend has abated. Meanwhile, 
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sustainment and service-life-extension phases helped perpetuate a vicious cycle. 
Expensive aircraft require long-service lives to justify their development costs and hold 
the line until their replacements achieve full operating capacity. In order to facilitate that 
long service life, they must be built from the outset with redundant capacity and leading-
edge systems—which of course, make them more expensive to begin with.  
2. Modularity and the Federated Systems Approach 
 Most aircraft in current U.S. military service today feature avionics built along a 
Federated Systems Model. This architecture dates back to the late-Vietnam era, and grew 
out of an approach described as “Form, Fit, Function” (Helfrick, 2000, p. 315), which 
was intended to contain costs and streamline maintenance. The analogy to the household 
lightbulb detailed in Albert Helfrick’s Principles of Avionics, provides a ready 
illustration. It is easy to replace a failed light bulb with a new one or even a new type of 
light bulb because prevailing standards ensure that the socket dimensions are the same, 
and the current-draw within limits. The “form” and “fit” are compatible, and the 
“function” is specified within the standard in terms of output – not how that output is 
achieved within the unit itself. Clearly, an LED “bulb” produces light in a completely 
different manner than an old incandescent bulb, but the standards governing light sockets 
or household electrical wiring did not have to be re-written to accommodate the new 
technology (Helfrick, 2000, p. 316). Consequently, one does not have to re-wire one’s 
home in order to switch to new lightbulbs, reducing cost of ownership.  
 In terms of federated aircraft avionics, these standardized, interchangeable “light 
bulbs” are LRUs, or Line Replaceable Units. LRUs are the so-called “Black Boxes” that 
make up individual function-based avionics-components. The “line-replaceable” 
appellation requires three things:  
• The component can be removed or installed by a single maintainer with 
minimal or no tools.  
• A replacement LRU can be installed in the place of a failed unit without 
extensive testing or calibration.  
• The LRU itself must be sufficiently rugged to endure rough handling prior 
and during installation. (Helfrick, 2000, p. 315) 
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 In the Federated Model, the arrangement of LRUs mirrors the functional 
decomposition of a given aircraft’s avionics suite. Each function-area will be served by a 
series of interconnected devices that perform sub-functions in series. Most of these 
devices are micro-processor controlled, and as many as practical are built into LRU-form, 
to facilitate maintenance, and simplify airframe design. Replication and coordination are 
hallmarks of Federated Systems. Standardized form, fit, and function prevails down to 
the level of physical interface between sub-components. Integration between functional 
branches is intentionally limited, and generally only occurs at a very high level.. 
Processing resources are not shared. 
 There are advantages (Hagen, Hurt, & Sorenson, 2013) to this loose federation of 
compartmentalized systems:  
• There is no single point of failure for the entire system.  
• The performance and reliability of a functional branch is not dependent on 
the system as a whole, simplifying both certification and trouble-shooting.  
• The need for high-performance computing assets is reduced, since system 
tasks are distributed across many individual processors.  
 These advantages, however, are mitigated (Fuchsen, 2009) by some notable 
drawbacks:   
• Lack of integration between functional branches means that each branch 
has many potential single points of failure.  
• Decomposing the system into standardized LRU’s increases wire-count, 
system weight, and power-consumption, and inhibits efficient resource 
pooling.  
• Unneeded memory or processing capacity in one functional unit or branch 
is essentially “trapped” – it cannot be leveraged to increase the 
performance of another unit or branch which may be over-burdened at the 
moment. As a result, a large amount of excess capability must be designed 
in to every component from the outset, increasing cost, complexity, and 
weight.  
Perhaps the most salient shortcoming of the federated systems model (as it has 
historically been implemented) is the fact that “Form, Fit, and Function” was only 
applied as far as the physical level. Differing network protocols, bus connections, and 
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software languages limited reuse across platforms. This means that, in practice, the 
majority of LRU’s are unique components, specific to a single type-model aircraft. 
SYSGO AG researcher Rudolf Fuchsen describes the resulting impact: “The increasing 
number of separate devices, each with its own development, certification and update 
process and the need to maintain spare parts for all these devices in all configurations 
became more and more a logistic and economic problem.” (Fuchsen, 2009, p. 7.B.5-1) 
For a deployed military force, reliant on the support of complex aircraft, 
maintained in austere forward environments, such “economic” problems can easily 
translate to operation shortcomings.   
3. First-Generation Digital Data Bus Standards 
 With the advent of micro-processor-equipped Line-Replaceable Units in military 
and civil aviation, it was clear that a standardized network protocol was required to allow 
the dispersed system components to exchange data. The military solution was designated 
MIL-STD-1553B. First conceived in the late sixties and fully implemented by 1973, this 
standard describes a half-duplex digital data bus utilizing time-division multiple-access 
(TDMA), command-and-response protocol between up to 31 remote terminals (IE: LRUs 
or other system components). Communications are regulated by dual-redundant bus-
controllers with dual-redundant bus cables that specify the sending unit and the receiving 
unit for each transaction. A minimum throughput of 1 Mbps (megabit-per-second) was 
called for. (“MIL-STD-1553,” n.d.) If more than 31 terminals are required, separate 
1553B data buses are added, and linked via controlled gateways.  
 Envisioning more modest requirements and wishing to keep costs in line, the civil 
aviation sector arrived at its own 1st-generation standard:  ARINC 429. This schema did 
without the multiplexing specified in the military standard, relying instead of parallel 
communication paths between all networked devices for separate sending and receiving 
channels. This one-way data-bus architecture limited the speed and throughput, and could 
only integrate 20 devices on a single network backplane. The double-weight of wiring 
required for separate send and receive channels also contributes to system overhead – a 
shortcoming avoided by the 1553’s time-division multiple-access (TDMA) 
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communications protocol. Even with these inherent limitations, the 429 bus was broadly 
adopted and has remained a common standard. The follow-on technology, ARINC 629, 
developed by Boeing in the 1980s, finally adopted TDMA with collision avoidance, but 
does without the 1553B’s bus-controllers by employing priority message algorithms. 
(Curran, 1992, p. 22) 
 The development of the both civil and military digital data bus standards 
paralleled the evolution of ground-based network computing and there was close 
interaction between the emerging fields. Fiber-optic transmission media was 
subsequently integrated into both (the revised MIL-STD-1773 was the result), increasing 
data throughput to as much as 50 Mbps.  
 As network throughput increased and parallel advances were made in processor 
speed and memory capacity, aircraft system designers were tempted to begin integrating 
more capability into fewer and fewer discrete hardware modules. The SWAP advantages 
of integration still had to be balanced, however, against the ruggedness and ease-of-
maintenance afforded by loosely federated modular architecture. These seemingly 
divergent strategies lead eventually to the development of an entirely new model in the 
1990s: Integrated Modular Avionics or IMA.  
4. Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) – Generation One  
 How exactly can an avionics system be both integrated and modular? The key 
concept is the LRM, or Line Replaceable Module. This differs from the previously 
described LRU insomuch as it is a generic processor, capable of performing a variety of 
functions depending on installation and software. (Curran, 1992, p. 24)  Otherwise, the 
standardized form-factor concept from the LRU is retained, although the intent of IMA 
architectures is to co-locate many LRMs in a central location (advantageous to the design 
of the aircraft) and link them upon a shared backplane. Connectivity to the distributed 
sensors and effectors is provided by Ethernet-based fiber-optic cable network. The 
architecture allows for what European researchers Mirko Jakovljevic and Astrit Ademaj 
describe as “embedded resource sharing” (2013, p. 7D5-1). In addition to the SWAP 
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benefits of such an arrangement, they also assert that IMA “supports design of new 
integrated functional capabilities which could not be implemented in a federated system.”  
 Given the real-time (or near-real-time) performance requirements present in many 
aircraft avionics and mission systems, time-partitioning of some order determines the 
extent to which resource-sharing can be applied. Effective time-partitioning provides for 
efficient multi-tasking with deterministic Quality of Service (QOS) provided to all 
concurrent processes. In absence of adequate prioritization controls (including memory), 
a shared processing environment might allow multiple low-or-medium-priority functions 
to dangerously draw resources away from the smaller subset of mission-critical or safety-
of-flight functions.  
 The issue of adequate time-partitioning and guaranteed QOS for high criticality 
functions led to the development of the ARINC 653 standard, initially released in 1996 
(as a joint project of Boeing and AEEC). This specification describes a Real Time 
Operating System, with associated Application Executive (APEX) and Application 
Programming Interface (API). The API calls for 51 routines, allowing time and space 
(memory) partitioning, health monitoring (error detection and reporting), and 
communications via “ports.” (IEEE, 2008, p. 14). Individual APIs have been developed 
for both C and Ada languages, to allow use in both military and civil applications. 
 With ARINC 653 providing for deterministic cross-functional resource-sharing, 
another standard, ARINC 664 describes the way nodes within the network are connected. 
Also known as AFDX (Avionics Full-Duplex network), ARINC 664 is a profiled, 
switched Ethernet-based network standard for high-speed digital avionics 
communications. Utilizing these two standards together, IMA architecture was 
implemented by Airbus in the A380 passenger liner. As described by Jakovljevic and 
Astrit Ademaj, the system “replaces multiple LRUs by a smaller number of more generic 
Core Processing and Input Output Modules (CPIOMs) integrated into an Avionics Bay 
sharing the power supply and the communication connection.” (Jakovljevic & Ademaj, 
2013, p. 7.B.5-2) The CPIOMs consist of a physically distinct CPU (running AFDX) and 
various I/O modules (all implemented as LRMs) that provide tailored interface with 
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various peripherals serviced by the module (IE: sensors, displays, control actuators, etc.). 
The CPIOMs are connected via a star-topology AFDX network. (See Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1.   Airbus A380, domain-based IMA 
(from Jakovljevic & Ademaj, 2013)   
 Apparent from this description: resource-pooling in the Airbus A380’s IMA 
architecture is not system-wide. The number of stove-pipes has been greatly reduced 
however by incorporating many individual functions into just three subsystem domains:  
“cockpit (electrical flight control, communications and warning); cabin (air conditioning 
and pneumatics); and utilities, including energy, fuel functions and landing gear 
functions.” (Ramsey, 2005) Rockwell-Collins, the firm that designed the system claims 
that 100 unique LRUs were eliminated as a result of functional integration (Mairaj & 
Tahir, 2014, Table 4).   
 A somewhat more aggressive application of the IMA principals can be found in 
the Boeing 787 “Dreamliner.”  Rather than domain-based partitioning of computing 
resources, the 787’s architecture implements a Common Core Systems Approach (CCS), 
where the entire spectrum of assigned domains is serviced by a single, Common 
Computing Resource (CCR) consisting of multiple General Processing Modules (GPM) – 
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which are all identical LRMs – and a minimal number of Application Specific Modules 
(ASM)s linked via an AFDX backplane. (See Figure 2.) 
  The key enabler of this and other IMA systems is the distributed network of 
standardized Remote Data Concentrators. RDCs act as a connection point where discrete, 
or analog signals from I/O peripherals are converted for transmission within the AFDX 
Ethernet network. They are located in close physical proximity to the sensors or other 
devices they serve, and one RDC can serve as may devices as its ports and processing 
capacity allow. This eliminates the signal corruption issue of sending non-digital 
information across long-transmission lines, and combats latency by off-loading the 
signal-conversion task from the centralized CCR. (Jakovljevic & Ademaj, 2013, p. 7D5-
5). Of note, RDC’s will also allow the re-use of older digital devices designed for the 
legacy ARINC 429 network, if such is desired. (For DOD Applications, were weapon 
systems have long been standardized under MIL-STD-1553B, the use of such RDC’s is a 
vital enabler for integration.) 
 
Figure 2.  Boeing 787. CCS-based IMA (from Jakovljevic & Ademaj, 2013) 
 According to Boeing press reports, system engineers on the 787 were able to 
integrate 80 different functions—from anti-icing systems to passenger Internet access— 
while at the same time, eliminating over a hundred unique LRUs. (Ramsey, 2005) 
Furthermore, data fusion and sharing across domains allows for enhanced on-board 
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diagnostics, event-logging, and maintenance reporting. Flight crews are provided with 
Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) which are fully tied into the aircraft’s navigation 
equipment and displays and communication’s suite. In other words, the aircrafts avionics 
system is now capable of performing much of the integration and processing feats that 
pilots, flight engineers and maintenance personnel previous had to do themselves in 
converting data to information to understanding, and finally, to action.    
5. Military IMA 
 The development of IMA architectures has not been confined to civil aviation. 
The F-22 Raptor’s avionics architecture was built along a domain-based IMA approach 
that technically predated that used in the Airbus A380. The aircraft features two separate 
Common Integrated Processors (CIPs) to provide centralized computing resources, split 
across three functional domains:  Mission Management, Sensor Management, and 
Vehicle Management. (Spitzer, 2001, Chapter 32) Each CIP is actually a cluster of 
individual, modular processing units, with identical form-factor, but differing 
capabilities. Seven different types are employed to control the full set of domain 
functions. Up to 66 of these processing cards can be installed in each self-contained CIP 
rack, but currently 19 slots remain open in CIP #1 and 22 are unused in CIP #2, allowing 
for future growth. Provisions were made within the airframe for the installation of a third 
CIP, should that become necessary (Lockheed-Martin, ND).   
 Much of the processing power of the F-22 (and other modern tactical aircraft) is 
dedicated to presenting high-fidelity, graphic-intensive cockpit displays to the pilot. MIL-
STD-1553 data busses offered inadequate throughput for such data-heavy applications; 
indeed, fourth-generation fighters with glass cockpits, such as the F-16 and F-18, had 
been forced to rely upon a patchwork of multiple 1553 busses to achieve the necessary 
capacity. (Kopp, 2001) At the same time, the newer, faster, fiber-based 1553 standard 
(MIL-STD-1773) did not offer the deterministic isochronous performance that the F-22 
design team needed in order to integrate time-critical functions into the common avionics 
network. At the time, ARINC 653 (AFDX) was still in development (by Airbus), and 
Lockheed decided to go with another emerging standard:  IEEE 1394, better known by its 
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consumer-electronics trade name “Firewire.” This solution provided the necessary 
performance and characteristics but has not achieved any wide-spread use in other 
aircraft besides the F-22. Subsequent developments of IEEE 1394 have demonstrated that 
gigabit transfer rates are possible (Baltasar & Chapelle, 2001, p. 15), and it may yet 
emerge as an important standard for military avionics, but enthusiasm for Firewire seems 
to have cooled in the last decade—perhaps because of the success of AFDX in the Airbus 
A380/350, and Boeing 787.     
  
Figure 3.  Timeline: avionics standards versus aircraft technology adoption 
B. SIZE-WEIGHT-POWER BENEFITS OF IMA  
 With the recent proliferation of IMA-style avionics in commercial aircraft, it has 
finally become possible to quantify the size-weight-and-power reductions that are 
typically achieved with such an architecture. A 2014 study by two Pakistani researchers,  
Aamir Mairaj and Rohail Tahir, compiled manufacturer-supplied data from twenty-eight 
different aircraft to determine what, if any, real gains had been realized. A few of these 
aircraft, such as the Boeing 787, were designed from the ground-up as IMA platforms but 
had a history of very similar aircraft from which to draw comparisons. The majority of 
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study subjects, however, were aircraft that had initially been equipped with federated 
systems, and then later upgraded to IMA. The results demonstrated conclusively that the 
logical efficiency of deconstructing the domain-stovepipes and sharing system resources 
translates into very real SWAP benefits. (Mairaj & Tahir, 2014)  Select data from the 
study are depicted in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.   SWAP Benefits for IMA (after Mairaj and Tahir, 2014) 
PERCENTAGE VOLUME REDUCTION 
 
LRU ELIMINATED 
aircraft volume reduced % 
 
aircraft number eliminated 
Boeing 777 ER 50.0% 
 
Boeing 787 100 
Airbus A380 50.0% 
 
Airbus A380 100 
Rafale 50.0% 
 
Embraer 170/190 15 
Cessna Citation 40.0% 
 
Raytheon Hawker 13 
Challenger 601 28.3% 
 
Challenger 601 15 
Falcon 20 28.3% 
 
Falcon 20 15 
King Air 350 50.0% 
 
King Air 350 15 
King Air 300 28.3% 
 
FD 728 14 
     WEIGHT REDUCTION 
 
POWER REDUCTION 
aircraft weight shedding (lbs) 
 
aircraft % power reduced 
Boeing 787 2000 
 
Boeing 777 ER 50 
Cessna Citation 300 
 
Rafale 60 
Embraer 170/190 550 
 
Challenger 601 38 
Gulfstream G350 300 
 
Falcon 20/50 38 
Raytheon Hawker 341 
 
King Air 350 38 
FD 728 462 
   Challenger 601 500 
   Falcon 20 340 
   King Air A350 100 
   King Air 300 348 
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 Mairaj and Tahir summarized their results as follows: “The analysis reveals that 
in all these projects SWAP efficiency was achieved: a size reduction ranging 28.28 %–50 
%, a power reduction ranging 38%–60 %, and a weight reduction ranging 25 %–50 % 
was attained. Moreover, the transition appears to be more advantageous on large-size 
aircraft”  (para. V.). 
 It follows intuitively that the more complex an aircraft is (in terms of desired 
avionics functionality) the more opportunities exist for component integration and 
resource-sharing; thus is no surprise the biggest “gainers” in Mairaj and Tahir’s survey 
are the large airliners (Boeing and Airbus) and the multi-role fighter (Dassault Rafale). 
Logically, the ratio of an aircraft’s dry, empty weight to the weight of its avionics 
systems would determine what sort of performance gains an aircraft might see from a 
given reduction in the latter. The larger the ratio, the more significant the effect.  
 Medium-size, multi-role military aircraft (such as the Rafale, or more germane to 
this thesis, the FVL) likely have the highest such ratio of any manned platforms flying 
today. The implication is that this class of machinery stands to gain the most by 
transitioning to an advanced integrated architecture.  
C. INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS—GENERATION TWO 
 Despite the demonstrated advantages of IMA-based systems and the clear success 
of the Boeing 787, the Airbus A380/A350, there is ample room to develop follow-on 
architectures that move beyond these first-generation designs and achieve even greater 
SWAP gains—primarily through extensive virtualization. In an ideal Second-Generation 
Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA2G) system, there are no LRUs or even physical 
ASMs. (See Figure 3.) An aircraft-wide network of Common RDCs would link sensors 
and effectors to the digital data bus, and application specific software modules—virtual 
ASMs—reside and carry out their tasks within an abstracted environment created by an 
avionics “cloud” of GPMs. The total aggregate resources of that cloud would be available 
for subdivision into any imaginable combination of requirements.  
 It should be emphasized that the computing and memory resources of the avionics 
cloud need not physically be located in a central location within the aircraft. In a civil 
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aircraft, they almost certainly would be, simply for the sake of practicality and 
maximizing passenger and cargo space. For a military application, where resiliency 
against battle damage and tight packaging constraints might apply, the Centralized 
Computing Resources might actually be highly decentralized physically. The physical 
separation of processing from input/output is a key aspect of all IMA, but especially the 
proposed second-generation standard. For that reason, IMA2G is sometimes referred to 
(or associated with the concept of) Distributed Modular Electronics, or DME. (Fuchsen, 
2009) 
 
Figure 4.  IMA2G - Distributed Embedded System Virtualization 
(from Jakovljevic & Ademaj, 2013) 
 IMA2G encompasses a wide range of technologies and approaches, with myriad 
potential benefits. Most obvious is the chance to build further upon the SWAP and life-
cycle cost reductions already evident where first-generation IMA has supplanted 
federated systems. More significant perhaps in the long term, however, is the opportunity 
to change the way aircraft (especially military aircraft) are designed, tested, certified, 
operated, maintained, and re-developed.  
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1. Challenges 
 Current challenges to advanced IMA implementation are well-documented. 
(Jakovljevic & Ademaj, 2013; Fuchsen, 2009; Wolf, 2008, etc.) For the purpose of this 
study we will focus on five specific areas: 
• High-speed networking—required to connect distributed, embedded 
processors. 
• Multi-Core processing—required to facilitate high-performance system 
demands. 
• Secure virtualization—to enable reliable functionality within the avionics 
cloud and defend against malicious agents. 
• Open standards software integration—to streamline development. 
• Model-based development, verification and certification—to ensure that 
the right system is built for the requirements, and that testing and 
certification delays do not impede system life-cycle. 
D. CURRENT IMA2G INITIATIVES 
1. SCARLETT 
 According to their organizational website, Project SCARLETT is a European 
consortium with members from 39 countries, organized under the auspices of the EU’s 
7th Framework Program (FP7) for advancing research in innovative high-tech fields. 
SCARLETT is said to stand for “SCAlable and ReconfigurabLe Electronics plaTforms 
and Tools.” Their stated goal is to bring about the next generation of Integrated Modular 
Avionics. Since 2008, they have been perhaps the most vocal driver of research in the 
field. Indeed, the term IMA2G used throughout this paper seems to have been coined by 
this group, and it strongly associated with them. By no means, however, do they hold a 
monopoly on the concept. SCARLETT researcher Rudolf Fuchsen describes the bottom-
line of what they seek to achieve with their work: “reduction of development and 
maintenance costs, reduction of certification costs by means of incremental certification, 
reduction of energy costs and an increased availability.” To that end, he further identifies 
seven areas of focused research. (Compare these to the challenges listed in the prior 
section):  
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• Separate I/O From Computing Modules. 
• Support Increased Computing Performance. 
• Provide Abstraction Of Platform Level Services. 
• Implement Reconfiguration Mechanisms. 
• Provide Integrated Processes And Tool-Sets. 
• Technological Survey Of Packaging Solutions. 
• Support Definition Of Associated Standards. (Fuchsen, 2009, p. 7.B.5-2)  
2. FACE 
 The Future Airborne Capabilities Environment (FACE) is a public-private-sector 
consortium, organized in 2010 for the express purpose of defining a new, open, avionics 
standard for airborne military systems. (The Open Group, n.d.)”  FACE Consortium 
members are a “who’s who” of the U.S. aviation and avionics segment, including 
Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, Bell Helicopter, Sikorsky, Honeywell, Rockwell-Collins, etc. 
DOD partners, meanwhile, include Navy Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and the 
Program Executive Office (PEO) for Army Aviation. In other words, FACE appears to 
have the both the resources and the influence to truly establish a broadly-supported 
standard for a Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA). Although the term 
“IMA2G” does not appear in the group’s self-promotion materials, their espoused goals 
of developing an open, modular, standard for horizontal and vertical software interfaces 
in military identifies them as part of the same trend-line. Their technical standard is 
currently in its version 2.1 iteration, and divides the computing environment in five 
layers: Operating System Segment, the Input/Output Services Segment, the Platform-
Specific Services Segment, Transport Services Segment, and the Portable Component 
Segment.  
E. FVL PROGRAM  
 In October 2008, the Future Vertical Lift program (FVL) was announced; 
covering a number of individual development efforts aimed at bringing the next 
generation of military helicopters (or helicopter-like aircraft) into existence. This 
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initiative is a result of the belated realization that the DOD’s current fleet of vertical lift 
aircraft has been historically under-developed compared to fixed-wing counterparts, and 
will not meet the performance, payload, availability and survivability metrics required for 
sustained world-wide Joint Forces operations. Ultimately, four different airframes of 
varying sizes (light, medium, heavy, and ultra-heavy) are envisioned, replacing some 
4000 OH-58s, OH-6s, H-60s, AH-64s, CH-47s and H-53s in service with the U.S. Army, 
Navy, and Air Force. (Defense Industry Daily, 2013) 
1. FVL ICD: Desired Attributes and Outcomes  
 A draft copy of the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) for the FVL Family of 
Systems was released in December of 2011 and finalized seven months later in July 
2012. Table 2, below, summarizes the desired performance parameters listed in the ICD, 
which represent an order-of-magnitude increase over what current DOD rotorcraft are 
capable of. Essentially, Future Vertical Lift aircraft will be expected to fly roughly twice 
as fast, twice as far, while carrying the same or greater payload. (Jeffrey, 2012)   
Table 2.   Threshold/objective performance requirements for FVL variants 
(after USA, 2011) 
 Speed (cruise) Combat 
Radius 
Payload (int/ext) Passengers 
JMR-Light 230-300 kts 265 nm* 2,000-4,500 lbs 4-6 
JMR-Medium 230-300 kts 265 nm* 6,000-20,000 lbs 11-24 
JMR-Heavy 230-300 kts 265 nm* 16,000-30,000 
lbs 
33-44 
JMR-Ultra 230-300 kts 350 nm* 40,000-72,000 
lbs 
100-120 
*Defined as “unrefueled distance w/2.0 hr loiter (full combat load at 6k/95° F)” 
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This includes an emphasis on the ability to operate in hot/heavy/high conditions. 
The combat radius listed is based on 95° F day at 6000 ft pressure altitude, with a full 
combat load and a two-hour loiter time in the mission area. To extend that further, all 
variants are to be capable of aerial refueling, making strategic self-deployment a reality. 
Meanwhile, to ensure survivability, state-of-the-art countermeasures must be included in 
all airframes, and the design should incorporate lessons learned from combat losses in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Summarizing FVL requirements, The ICD lists the following as desired attributes 
and outcomes:  
• Range/Payload. FVL FoS platforms must cover greatly expanded JFOR 
areas of operation in worldwide conditions with playloads responsive to 
mission requirements. 
• Flight Performance … platforms will have the ability to minimize transit 
time, solve mismatches in flight capabilities of vertical lift assets, enable 
time-critical MEDEVAC missions, conduct maneuvering flight to evade 
enemy fires and operate in complex terrain. 
• Deployability … conduct operational maneuver from strategic distances. 
• Shipboard Operation … USN, USMC, USCG and SOF FVL FoS 
platforms will be shipboard compatible … USA and USAF FVL platforms 
will be shipboard capable … Operational performance shall not be 
degraded by electromagnetic environmental (E3) effects. 
• Weapons … capable of integrating multiple Joint weapon types to rapidly 
configure for volume fire, precision and area effects weapon types and 
mixes. 
• Sensors … employ an array of multi-spectral, multi-function sensors … 
fully integrated with targeting, navigation, and aircraft survivability 
equipment to effectively target and enable terrain flight during night and 
in Degraded Visual Environment (DVE). 
• Teaming. Applicable FVL FoS platforms must control unmanned systems 
up to Level of Interoperability (LOI) 5. Unmanned or optionally-piloted 
versions of FVL variants must meet Joint interoperability profiles for 
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Ground Control Stations (GCS). 
• Enhanced Situational Awareness … provide an integrated common air 
and ground picture to the pilots and crew, with automatic reporting … 
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[internal and external] … of threats, inclement weather, and other hazards 
encountered enroute. 
• Crew Station … provide a fully-integrated crew station enabling mission-
focused operations [and] Joint mission planning systems compatibility, 
automation of critical battle tasks, cognitive aiding and decision making, 
fused sensor imagery, and interoperable communications/data systems … 
minimizing crew workload. FOS platforms will also provide decreased 
cold start and airborne times. 
• NetCentric … comply with the provision of the Net Ready Key 
Performance Parameter (NR-KPP) per CJCSI 6216.01F. Sensor data … 
will be fully compatible with the Future Mission Network (FMN) 
environment, Joint Service air/ground, allied, civilian (law enforcement-
LE and maritime), mission command systems, to include the DOD 
Information Enterprise Architecture (IEA) and DODI 8320.02.” (U.S. 
Department of the Army [USA], 2011, p. 3) 
 Naturally, in keeping with today’s highly contentious budgetary climate, all of 
these enhanced capabilities are to be delivered along with reduced maintenance/operating 
costs, increased reliability, extended service-life and a high degree of component 
commonality between all FVL variants, including an open-systems, modular mission-
systems suite.  
2. Joint Multi-Role Technology Demonstrator 
 In an attempt to reduce the technological risk of developing an entire family of  
aircraft at once, the DOD has established a precursor program focusing on the medium 
lift platform. The Joint Multi-Role Technology Demonstrator, (JMR-TD) is a competitive 
development program, funded and administered by the Army PEO for Aviation. Several 
prototype  middle-weight FVL contenders will be sourced from different manufacturers, 
and evaluated for performance potential and technological maturity. The winner (or 
winners) will then be awarded follow-on contracts to build aircraft for the Light, 
Medium, Heavy, and Ultra-Heavy classes within the FVL Family of Systems, using the 
technology explored in their middle-weight proof-of-concept.  
 At the time of this writing, the nine initial industry proposals have been down-
selected to four. Boeing-Sikorsky’s concept builds upon the compound-helicopter 
architecture developed for their X-2 demonstrator vehicle; AVX’s proposal is a variation 
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on the same theme, with twin-ducted fans supplanting a single pusher tail rotor. 
Meanwhile, both Bell Helicopter and Karem Aircraft are developing advanced tilt-rotor 
platforms that they hope will be scalable and address some of the operational limitations 
or shortcomings of the similarly-configured V-22 Osprey. What all designs seem to have 
in common is multi-mode flight operation that will make fly-by-wire control a virtual 
requirement—a technology that is still novel among rotary-wing aircraft.  
 In the event it is determined that no single platform can successfully be scaled 
across all weight classes and still meet performance requirements, more than one concept 
may be accepted. Regardless of the aircraft layout however, all FVL aircraft are to feature 
a common, avionics architecture. Clearly, this will require a flexibility that would be 
difficult or impossible to achieve with a traditional federated systems model. 
 The requirement for a common avionics architecture is a reflection of 
supportability as a major emphasis area within the FVL program. Expected 
characteristics include “the ability to increase the service rate for aviation mission 
requests without expanding force structure, […] open systems architecture […] reduce 
fuel consumption and logistics footprint, share common training, education and 
equipment across the Joint VTOL fleet.” (U.S. Department of the Army [USA], 2011, p. 
1)  
 Initial Operating Capacity (IOC) for the FVL-medium lift variant is 
conservatively set at 2035, allowing apparently ample time for cutting-edge technology to 
develop and mature. FVL contenders are expected to be flying prototype JMR airframes 
by mid-2017.  
 After the initial phase of competition, which will be focused on aircraft 
performance deliverables concludes, Phase II will pick up, with evaluation of aircraft 
avionics and mission systems. This portion is considered a semi-independent 
development effort, complete with its own program name:  The Joint Common 
Architecture. A Broad Area Announcement (BAA) was issued for the JCA in March of 
2014. In June of the same year, development contracts were awarded to Boeing and 
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Honeywell to build demonstrator modules to prove the feasibility of open-systems 
software architecture in an IMA environment.   
  Given that nearly all of the major industry players involved in the FVL and JCA 
programs also happen to be members of the FACE consortium, FACE standards are 
likely to figure prominently in the architecture that eventually emerges.  
F. BOEING JOINT COMMON ARCHITECTURE STUDY 
 Within the Sikorksy-Boeing FVL team, Boeing will likely take the lead role in 
avionics, mission-system and VMS development. The Seattle-based company’s 
experience with the highly integrated architecture of the 787 airliner, lends credibility to 
their efforts and suggests that some sort of advanced IMA architecture will find its way 
into their FVL design. The author of this study conducted an interview in September 
2014 with Tom Dubois, JMR/FVL chief systems architect at Boeing’s military aircraft 
division, and gained some detailed insights on the program. Most relevant perhaps to this 
thesis is the fact that no firm decision has been made on the customer side about the 
extent to which current IMA trends toward virtualization, centralized processing, and 
distributed real-time embedded systems will be incorporated into the Joint Common 
Architecture. The ICD and other government documents only describe the capabilities 
sought, not the means by which they should be achieved. The challenge for Boeing and 
other contractors is to strike a balance between accomplishing the DOD’s ambitious 
objectives on one hand, and yet not going further with novel technology than their 
customer is comfortable with.  
 Du Bois was able to confirm that Boeing is indeed pursuing an approach that will 
blur the line between electronics and the air vehicle itself. In their concept, the JCA will 
definitively cross over into domains traditionally considered vehicle management, IE:  
“Things that touch the flight controls.”  Beyond addressing size-weight-and-power 
concerns, achieving this level of integration, Du Bois believes, will help facilitate the 
desired level of interoperability and interchangeability between manned and unmanned 
FVL variants. (T. Du Bois, personal communication, September 25, 2014). He also 
expressed confidence that advances in technology will allow the data-rates, processing 
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and through-put necessary for highly-centralized processing. “For the foreseeable future,” 
he explains, “there is still going to be a need for some form of data concentration” – IE: 
Remote Data Concentrators, to perform translation and network gateway functions for 
devices on the periphery of the network that may not be directly compatible.  
1. What Is the Joint Common Architecture? 
 It is easy to misunderstand exactly what Boeing-Sikorsky and competitors at Bell 
and Honeywell are trying to create in response to the JCA BAA. “No one is going to 
build a JCA for the FVL,” explained Dubois (T. Du Bois, interview, September 25, 
2014).  That is because the JCA is not intended to be a specific set of hardware. Rather, 
the intent is to prove that an open-systems architecture, based perhaps on FACE technical 
standards, can enable a cost-efficient, modular approach to developing and fielding 
hardware and software. According to the Boeing system’s architect:    
• The JCA is functional decomposition 
• The JCA is referential, conceptual 
• The JCA applies “IMA at its very highest levels” 
• JCA is more guidance then blue-prints 
• JCA encompasses system-developer tools 
• JCA utilizes FACE open technical standards 
• JCA is to be nominally owned by the Gov’t, while FACE belongs to the 
industry 
  If the JCA achieves its goals, the software developed to run on-board systems 
will be completely agnostic from the underlying hardware and platform. This offers  
several potential benefits from the perspective of aircraft life-cycle costs.  
• Software re-use across different aircraft types could streamline capability 
acquisition while ensuring seamless inter-operability.       
• Hardware re-purposed throughout a single aircraft or across multiple 
aircraft reduces development costs and shrinks logistical footprint required 
to maintain deployed aircraft.  
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• Software development independent of vendors access to the actual system 
hardware, promotes a competitive design environment, potentially 
lowering costs and accelerating new capability development.  
G. SUMMARY 
 The technological landscape of aircraft avionics has progressed to a state probably  
unimaginable to early pioneer aviators. As complexity and costs have increased, several 
successive strategies have been implemented to improve efficiency. The latest, Integrated 
Modular Avionics, seems poised to progress to a new, second-generation standard 
(IMA2G) which will incorporate unprecedented levels of resource-sharing and systems 
integration, while simultaneously permitting tailored physical distribution of computing 
assets as dictated by form-factor and survivability. In this chapter, we have explored the 
evolution of this technology, identified the remaining technical challenges to 
implementation, and introduced the context within which the rest of this study will 
proceed:  the application of advanced IMA to the Future Vertical Lift Family of Systems. 
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III. METHODS 
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 The impact of pursuing highly integrated, software-defined avionics architecture 
for the Future Vertical Lift Family of Systems is certain to be as multi-facetted and 
complex as the proposed system itself. In order to begin this assessment, a divide-and-
conquer approach will be applied, conducted on two separate levels: technological 
maturity, and suitability/alignment.  
1. Technology Maturity Assessment 
 We will model this portion of the study on the framework provided by the latest 
(2011) version of the DOD’s Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Deskbook, as 
prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 
(ASD(R&E))  Table 3. is derived from paragraph 2.4.1 of that document, and provides a 
template. 
Table 3.   Skeletal Template for TRA (from Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Research and Engineering [(ASD(R&E))], 2011, para. 2.4.1) 
1.0 Purpose of This Document 
2.0 Executive Summary 
3.0 Program Overview 
 3.1 Program Objective 
 3.2 Program Description 
 3.3 System Description 
4.0 Program Technology Risks Summary and Readiness Assessment 
 4.1 Process Description 
 4.2 Identification of Technologies Assessed 
 4.3 
PM’s and SME Team’s Assessments of Technology Risk and Technology 
Demonstration in a Relevant Environment 
  4.3.1 First Technology 
  4.3.2 Next Technology 
5.0 Summary 
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Referencing previous chapters of this thesis, the reader should be satisfied that the 
intended purposes of sections 1.0 through 3.3 of the TRA Deskbook template have been 
adequately accomplished. The present chapter, likewise, will accomplish the work of 
section 4.1, “Process Description,” and 4.2, “Identification of Technologies Assessed.”    
Given that advanced IMA is a broad field with many dependencies, our TRA will be 
broken down into the major challenge areas previously listed in Chapter II of this study: 
• High-speed networking  
• Multi-Core processing  
• Secure virtualization 
• Open standards software integration 
• Model-based development, verification and certification  
 Within each subject area, we describe the need, list the primary issues or 
difficulties involved, and survey recent or on-going developments. To fulfill the role of 
Subject Matter Experts (SME)—as called for the TRA methodology—several JCA-
program insiders have been interviewed and polled for their technical opinions. In 
addition, a variety of published sources have been considered, including both peer-
reviewed journal entries, and vender press-releases, were appropriate.  
 The assessed maturity level of each identified component of IMA2G will be 
expressed as integer on the standard Technology Readiness Level (TRL) scale, (see Table 
4.). A more complete chart (After ASD(R&E), 2011, para. 2.5) with descriptions and 
supporting details for each TRL is included in Appendix B.  
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Table 4.   TRL Definitions (after ASD(R&E), 2011, para. 2.5) 
TRL Definition 
1 Basic principles observed and reported. 
2 Technology concept and/or application formulated. 
3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of 
concept. 
4 Component and/or breadboard validation in a laboratory environment. 
5 Component and/or breadboard validation in a relevant environment. 
6 System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment. 
7 System prototype demonstration in an operational environment 
8 Actual system completed and qualified through test and demonstration 
9 Actual system proven through successful mission operations. 
 
2. IMA2G and FVL: Suitability and Alignment 
 We will first apply a comparative analysis of documented IMA outcomes and 
desired FVL attributes. Referencing the previously sighted study on SWAP reductions, 
along with other sources (including interviews with FVL/JCA insiders), against the 
approved program Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), this portion will focus on the 
following areas: 
• Aircraft Performance/Payload 
• Mission Capability/Flexibility 
• Manpower/Training 
• Development Timeline 
• Total Life-Cycle Costs 
• Safety and Survivability 
• Interoperability with UAS 
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For each area, we will determine to what extent, if any, an advanced IMA architecture 
would support achieving the desired metrics. Rather than attempt to extrapolate predicted 
values, only the basic character of the impact will be assessed, using as a baseline the 
likelihood of a federated systems approach achieving those same results. Ratings will 
then be expressed on the following five-point scale: strongly negative, negative, 
neutral/indeterminate, positive, and strongly positive. Owing to the current lack of a 
definitive IMA2G architecture installation aboard an operational military rotorcraft, 
specific predictions would be excessively speculative and of little value. The scope of this 
part of our inquiry must of necessity be limited to a single, qualitative assessment:  how 
much does the DOD stand to gain by incorporating IMA2G-principles into its next-
generation vertical-lift aircraft? 
B. SYNTHESIS AND PROJECTION 
 With the maturity level of IMA2G technology assessed, and the 
alignment/suitability determined, we will find ourselves in position to develop a 
meaningful synthesis. The amalgamation of our study findings will be expressed in two 
forms: first, a risk-versus-reward summary of applying open-architecture, software-
defined, highly-integrated avionics into the Joint Common Architecture for FVL; and 
second, a projected operational vignette depicting how a cyber-physical system of this 
kind might operate in a plausible future combat scenario.  
  After completing this synthesis and projection, we will offer our final conclusion. 
This conclusion will include recommendations on the technical architecture the DOD 
should pursue for next-generation rotorcraft, controls that can be implemented to reduce 
the inherent risks of that architecture, and finally, further research that should be done to 
build on, or validate the recommended approach.   
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IV. FINDINGS 
A. CURRENT CHALLENGES TO IMA2G IMPLEMENTATION 
 While first-generation IMA architectures represent the current state-of-the-art in 
aviation today, momentum is building for the emergence of true IMA2G systems. 
Though clear obstacles remain, recent developments represent significant inroads.  
1. Limited Data-Rates and Network Throughput 
 From a technical feasibility standpoint, the arch-nemesis of centralized processing 
on large and complex aircraft has traditionally been the rate at which data can be traverse 
from the boundaries of the system (near sensors and flight controls) to the shared 
computing resources and back. While critical flight control functions generally consume 
only modest volume of network traffic, their low tolerance for jitter and time-latency 
require careful handling. Although digital data bus standards have evolved to supply the 
requisite quality of service, that task is increasingly complicated by the trend toward 
ever-greater network traffic. The advanced sensors, external data links, graphical cockpit 
displays, etc., expected in operational aircraft today are a significant challenge to legacy 
systems, especially copper-based standards like MIL-STD-1553B. Advanced IMA2G 
systems will have to realize much higher effective throughput to ensure continued 
performance over their intended life-cycle.  
 One promising technology that may contribute is Time-Triggered Ethernet 
(TTEthernet). This standard, first described in 2005, unifies “realtime and non-real-time 
traffic into a single coherent communication architecture” (Kopetz, Ademaj, & 
Grillinger, 2005, p. 1). TTEthernet is essentially three protocols in one, with differing 
levels of service based on message-type: Deterministic Time-Triggered (TT) traffic, 
Event-driven or rate-constrained (RC) traffic, and Best-effort (BE) standard Ethernet 
traffic. TT service maintains the clock synchronization for all devices attached to the 
network, providing for a “global time [that] forms the basis for time-triggered network 
properties such as temporal partitioning, efficient resource utilization, parallel processing 
and precise diagnostics” (Bisson, 2011, p. 5).  
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Essentially, a standard Ethernet service provides for the bulk of high-volume 
traffic using standard message formatting. Event-driven messages take advantage of 
priority handling, (similar in principle to AFDX) while a separate, time-triggered 
function periodically takes control and ensures the unfettered transmission of sensitive 
real-time data. The technology was originally introduced by Austrian vendor TTTech, 
which promised fault-tolerant deterministic transmission of up to 100 mpbs. 
Subsequently, it has been codified as SAE standard AS6802. Now multiple vendors can 
be found offering PCI form-factor network end-nodes and switches. Total advertised 
throughput (for TT, RC and BE) is up to 1000 Mbps.  
The apparent advantage of TTEthernet over other “deterministic” Ethernet 
protocols (such as AXDX/ ARINC 664) is the provision for a baseline of standard 802.3-
compatible service. Whereas older deterministic solutions like the ones used in the 
Airbus A380/250, Boeing 787 and Lockheed F-22 are essentially proprietary network 
standards that must rely on network gateway devices for data-mapping with regular 
Ethernet, TTEthernet should allow seamless connectivity for devices not requiring real-
time service.  
Given the combined attributes of high bandwidth, sub millisecond jitter-rate, and 
IEEE 802.3 compatibility, TTEthernet/AS6802, seems to offer a workable network 
backbone on which a distributed real-time avionics environment could be built. Temporal 
synchronization across the network would allow for parallel processing to occur across 
physically separated clusters of avionics computers – making an aircraft so-equipped 
more resilient to battle-damage. So-called “temporal firewalls”  (Bisson, 2011, p. 5) 
could be automatically instituted at the switch or bus-control level in the event of a 
failure in one or more processing nodes. Basically, the network would go “deaf” during 
the time-partition assigned to a faulty device.    
Despite the promise of TTEthernet, our research has uncovered no present 
examples of operational military or civil aircraft utilizing the technology. It is however, 
being integrated into NASA’s Orion spacecraft, (TTTech.com News & Events, 2014) 
which recently completed its first unmanned test-flights. Boeing JCA System Architect 
Dr. Tom Du Bois also confirmed that at least one major aircraft development program 
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that he is aware of is also incorporating the technology (T. Du Bois, personal 
communication, September 25, 2014). Citing confidentiality, he declined to identify the 
aircraft or the manufacturer. With regard to Boeing’s own efforts to develop avionics for 
the FVL, he went on record as saying that time-triggered-Ethernet “or something like it” 
was a likely candidate—but no decision has yet been made.  
 It should be noted that outside of aviation, Time-Trigger Ethernet has begun to 
appear in production hardware. The automobile industry, which has been quietly and 
effectively developing IMA-like architectures in cars since the early 2000s, is a 
significant investor. German auto-giant Volkswagen has partnered with the originator of 
TTEthernet (TTTech) through its Audi subsidiary (Plankensteiner, 2012, p. 9). The 
current Audi A8 sedan incorporates this advanced, deterministic Ethernet backbone in 
order to facilitate what the company describes as “piloted driving” and “piloted parking,” 
which is to say, autonomous operation guided by a distributed network of integrated 
sensors and actuators (Lehner, 2014). 
 The level of sophistication and safety-critical reliability required of cutting-edge 
automotive systems should not be underestimated. Rapid product-development cycles 
and intense competition have led to massive advancements and highly-ambitious goals. 
With increasingly stringent government and consumer expectations for fuel economy,  
automotive designers have found themselves battling much of the same SWAP concerns 
as lead aerospace engineers to pursue wide-spread integration. It is not inconceivable that 
the industry move to increasingly connected, increasingly autonomous automobiles will 
make it a larger driver of cutting-edge networking and processing technology than the 
traditional aerospace/defense sectors within the next decade.   
a.  TRL Assessment for TTEthernet 
 Based on the findings of this study, TTEthernet, (AS6802) should be considered a 
rapidly-maturing technology with the ability to support a highly-integrated, distributed 
IMA2G architecture. In accordance with the DOD’s Technology Readiness Assessment 
(TRA) criteria (outlined in Chapter III), it would be appropriate to say it has achieved a 
TRL rating of 6, or “System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant 
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environment” (ASD(R&E), 2011, para. 2.5). The system prototype in question being the 
Orion space-vehicle. Given the extreme operating conditions inherent to orbital space-
flight, and the successful characterization of the flight test, it must be taken that 
TTEthernet has demonstrated some ability to function in a harsh environment. Naturally, 
the FVL’s intended environment is nothing like that of a space craft and may introduce 
other variables (in the form of dust, moisture, or battlefield RF), so this TRL rating must 
be considered tentative as far as application to the Joint Common Architecture is 
concerned.  
2. Determinism in Multi-Core CPUs 
 Much of the advances that have been made so far in digital avionics architectures 
have been enabled by the exponential growth in processing power available from 
commodity chip-sets. In the last decade, most of that growth has stemmed from the 
development of multi-core processors, yet current-generation avionics have yet to fully-
embrace this technology. There has been debate over how to best harness the 
performance advantages of multi-processing, while still ensuring strict determinism for 
high-criticality safety-of-flight functions. As a result, even the most advanced IMA1G 
architectures have remained reliant upon single-core CPUs, which are rapidly becoming 
obsolete as a commercial technology. Even though it may be possible to implement 
IMA2G without the support of multi-core hardware, as a minor consumer in the world-
wide marketplace for processors, the aircraft avionics industry can ill-afford to ignore the 
market trend (Huyck, 2012). Further, there is no doubt that the performance from multi-
core processors (MCPs) would greatly facilitate virtualization of resource-intensive 
applications.  
 There are two basic ways in which multi-core CPUs could be utilized:  Symmetric 
Multi-processing (SMP) and Asymmetric Multi-processing (AMP). In SMP, each core 
within the CPU works concurrently on a different process residing within a single 
partition. When the time allotted to that partition expires, the processes are interrupted 
and a new set of processes from the next scheduled partition are distributed to the 
independent CPU cores. In AMP, by contrast, each CPU core works on a process (or a 
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series of processes) from a different partition, until triggered to interrupt that work and 
take up a process within the next scheduled partition. As its name implies, Asymmetric 
multi-core CPUs may contain two or more different types of core, optimized for various 
types of calculations; whereas the individual cores within symmetrical multi-processors, 
are identical and inter-changeable.  
 Generally, SMP is used when the goal is over-all computational performance 
enhancement – true multi-thread processing (Walls, 2014). AMP is inherently less 
efficient, as it only performs concurrent work at the system process level; however, it 
allows designers to run an RTOS or latency-sensitive program within the same CPU that 
is simultaneously running a lower-criticality (but perhaps more resource-intensive) 
process. To further muddle the issue, some contend that real-world performance of AMP 
systems is actually the same or better than SMP when many cores are present and the 
scheduling kernel becomes the weak link (Hermeling, 2009). This is because process-
scheduling within partitions is simplified in AMP vis-à-vis SMP; IE: only one process is 
handled at a time from a given partition.  
 For the moment, AMP appears easier to implement with the current version of 
ARINC 653 standard, as memory resources shared by the processing cores can be 
apportioned along partition lines, avoiding conflict over memory address locations 
(Huyck, 2012). ARINC 653 has no mechanisms to subdivide such resources within a 
partition according to the number of cores currently splitting the work, so SMP may 
result in concurrent processes competing for the same memory resources.  
 It should also be noted that some advanced multi-core designs may combine AMP 
and SMP to balance the capabilities and trade-offs of each (Walls, 2014).  In such an 
application, a specialized multi-core within a multi-core, may be dedicated to AMP, 
while an array of identical cores on the same chip performs SMP. Such hybrid 
architecture seems likely to proliferate; thus it is imperative that methods of integrating 
SMP into ARINC 653 (or follow-on standards) be investigated.  
 In May of 2014, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released a position 
paper outlining its concerns for industry adoption of multi-core processors for safety-
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critical flight operations. The paper cites features typically built into such CPUs that 
allow: “shared access to cache or other memory areas, operating systems / supervisors / 
hypervisors … and coherency fabrics / coherency modules / interconnects that control all 
the data transfers between the MCP cores … via a shared bus.”  These features are 
asserted to have resulted in observable interference between applications running 
simultaneously on different cores within a processor during testing. The report goes on to 
say that “If safety-critical applications are to successfully execute on MCPs [multi-core 
processors], the allowable data latency of each input parameter to an application may 
have to be analyzed so it is ensured that the applications can cope with the worst case 
variations in data access times, which should be measured. The overall execution times of 
applications may have to include allowances for such variations” (Federal Aviation 
Administration [FAA], 2014, p. 4).   
 Despite this and other noted concerns, the FAA paper finally provided what some 
in the industry were waiting for: a roadmap to certification for multi-core processor-based 
systems consisting of 24 quantifiable objectives in determinism, software and error-
handling. Wind River Systems, a long-time leader in RTOS development has since 
announced that they are working on a successor to their successful VxWorks653 OS 
(utilized on the Boeing 787) that will be able to take advantage of dual-core silicon. 
(Wlad, 2014). If this new OS follows the pattern of the VxWorks 7Core product, an 
RTOS already certified for industrial applications, it could utilize an advanced form of 
SMP that gains new efficiency by allowing idle processes to be handled during residual, 
unused time apportioned to the active process. Wind River seems confident that they will 
be able to deliver this capability and still “ensure reliable, interference-free consolidation 
of multiple applications with different levels of safety criticality on one hardware 
platform” sufficient to satisfy government regulators (Wind River Systems, 2014). 
 Independent industry experts, such as David Arterburn, Director of Rotorcraft 
Systems Engineering and Simulation Center at the University of Alabama at Huntsville, 
are less-sanguine about the short-term prospects of multi-core processing, pointing to the 
difficulty of understanding and predicting complex interactions within quad-core chips, 
which are rapidly replacing dual-cores in consumer electronics. Charged with compiling 
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the studies of various. Army Aviation PEO-funded working groups researching JCA 
issues, Arterburn downplayed the significance of the CAST-32 paper, asserting that no 
multi-core chip installation has actually achieved official airworthiness. He was quick to 
point out however that the issue will soon come to a head. “Within five years” he 
predicted, “you won’t be able to buy a commodity single-core processor” (D. R. 
Arterburn, personal communication, January 22, 2015). Like it or not, industry and 
government will soon be forced to develop methods of designing and certifying MCP-
based systems – and that event-horizon is sufficiently near-term that it will likely be well-
sorted by the time any FVL variant is ready to fly in anything beyond experimental 
status.  
 In the meantime, the only work-around may be to install multi-core processors 
and then intentionally limit them to single-core utilization. This deals with the 
commercial availability aspect, but of course completely defeats the point of having an 
advanced processor to begin with. It also works against the very principles of IMA, 
requiring multiple physical LRMs to do the work that a single, fully-optimized module 
could do. It is also questionable whether simply de-powering all but a single processor on 
a chip would actually make it legally certifiable. A source consulted by this author, who 
declined to go on record, related that several recently introduced aircraft (including an 
army rotorcraft) are current flying with partially-disabled multi-core processors – without 
any real declaration or sanction.     
a. TRL Assessment for Multi-Core CPU Employment in Avionics 
 Based on the finding of this survey, it is apparent that MCP-integration is a hot-
topic in the aviation and avionics industry today. Multiple studies are underway, but both 
vendors and the government are remaining tight-lipped on the results. Given the lack of 
demonstrated success, we cannot, in good faith, assign a higher TRL than 4; “Component 
and/or breadboard validation in a laboratory environment” (ASD[R&E], 2011, para. 2.5). 
Given the urgency of establishing workable protocols and methods, we are confident 
however, that the next five years will see significant advances. Even if the Joint Common 
Architecture must be demonstrated in prototype form without the use of MCPs (or with 
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partially-disabled MCPs), it seems fairly likely that the FVL program will eventually be 
able to leverage them.  
3. High-Assurance Virtualization 
 As previously noted, extensive virtualization is the defining characteristic of  
second-generation IMA; however, there is still debate on how exactly to best implement 
that hardware abstraction for high-criticality vehicle management functions. Currently, 
full virtualization is the approach with the broadest (non-aviation) commercial use. In this 
schema, one or more complete, unmodified “guest” operating systems run atop a 
hypervisor. The hypervisor itself may have direct access to the hardware (in a so-called 
“bare metal” installation), or may run atop another operating system as a client program. 
In either case, the virtualized OS has no idea that it does not actually have access to its 
own processor and memory. Application-level service requests from its processes are 
passed directly to the real hardware by the hypervisor (or through the underlying OS, if 
present), while privileged-level commands from the guest OS are intercepted and 
translated so that they do not exert unfettered control over the processor and memory 
resources that must be shared with other guests.  
 In paravirtualization, the guest operating systems are installed with modified 
kernels, making the OS “aware” that it does not have direct access to its own resources. 
Instead of issuing un-executable calls that must be trapped and translated by the 
hypervisor, the guest OS kernel issues hypercalls that reduce virtualization overhead. 
This efficiency has a positive effect on performance, but the downside is that the hosted 
OS’s must be intrusively altered for installation. Though this is easily and affordably 
accomplished when OS source-code and vendor support is available, it can be a major 
obstacle to integrating older or proprietary OS’s in the virtual environment. (Windows, 
for instance).  
 The corresponding downside for full-virtualization is that hardware requirements 
are very specific. The guest OS must otherwise be able to run atop the actual underlying 
hardware. Using such a schema in an IMA architecture would seem to limit the choice of 
processing hardware and embedded OS’s to those that were natively compatible with 
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each other. (Most-likely x86-series processors.) This runs completely counter to the idea 
of using IMA2G to affect cost-savings on system development and life-cycle update. It 
also does not provide compatibility with the system resource partitioning concept 
enforced by ARINC 653 (Fuchsen, 2009, p. 7.B.5-6).   
 The present trend in hardware design is greater built-in support for virtualization, 
and it is possible that this will eventually allow comparable performance increases to 
paravirtualization without the need to modify the hosted operating systems.  
 In the meantime, hardware abstraction in the current IMA architectures relies on 
paravirtualization. In the Airbus implementations, this is provided by the Virtual Machine 
Monitoring (VMM) services of the well-established Pike Operating System. Instances of 
an ARINC 653-standard RTOS run in the abstracted environment, alongside LINUX, 
POSIX and other supported open-source operating systems. Similar capabilities are also 
touted by the makers of the Lynx OS 178 RTOS. This particular product is claimed to 
meet FAA’s DO-178B Level A certification standard for safety-critical avionics software 
“right out of the box” (Lynx Software Technologies, 2015). However, it should be noted 
that since the introduction of this RTOS, the FAA has introduced an updated standard – 
DO-178C – which adds five additional parameters to the 66 listed in -178B for “Level A” 
certification. There is no indication on the maker’s website that Lynx OS 178 RTOS has 
met these revised standards.  
a. TRL Assessment for High-Assurance Virtualization 
 High assurance paravirtualization has been used in aircraft avionics, in varying 
levels of criticality, for at least ten years now, and must be considered a mature 
technology, or TRL 9. Some SCARLET consortium researchers (Jakovljevic & Ademaj ) 
have asserted that PIKE OS ‘s Virtual Machine Manager is an adequate solution to the 
challenge of advanced IMA2G architectures, while others (Kleidermacher & Wolf, 2008) 
contend that hardware-assisted full-virtualization will likely be needed to deliver fully on 
the promise of  software cost-savings and streamlined re-development. This field 
however is far less mature, with a TRL level as low as 3: “Analytical and experimental 
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critical function and/or proof of concept.”  Adhering to the most conservative viewpoint, 
we will accept this latter assessment.    
4. High Robustness virtualization 
 The threat of malicious cyber-attack on the avionics of commercial aircraft must 
be considered a legitimate concern. Indeed, when the Boeing 787’s IMA architecture was 
announced to the general public at launch, some observers wondered openly at the 
wisdom of providing passenger Internet via the same physical computers that hosted the 
aircraft system controls. Was this not introducing a blatant attack vector into the system? 
While fears that a determined passenger might somehow take control of an airliner with 
their laptop computer are completely overblown given the actual architecture of the 
system, the basic premise is not without merit – especially when one considers the further 
integration of VMS functions in proposed IMA2G aircraft. For military aircraft, whose 
mission-systems will host applications of differing classification levels, achieving strong 
security compartmentalization between hosted OSs in an on-board virtual environment is 
critical. 
 Though virtualization has often been touted as a security measure in itself, in 
reality it is just part of a layered defense system – and one that has the potential to 
introduce its own security vulnerabilities. While hosted OS’s might indeed be isolated 
from each other and have restricted access to system resources, they do interface with the 
hypervisor. If the hypervisor contains exploitable security flaws, (let alone the underlying 
OS in a paravirtualized scheme), so-called guest-breakout is possible. Malicious code 
could easily spread from one guest system to another, or take over the entire host 
computer (Kleidermacher & Wolf, 2008, p. 1.C.3-5). 
 The most often-proposed remedy for achieving what the Nation Security Agency 
(NSA) describes as “High Robustness” in a multi-level secure architecture is the Multiple 
Independent Levels of Security (MILS) concept, first described in 1984 by noted 
computer scientist John Rushby (Parkinson & Baker, 2011). A MILS-type architecture is 
based on two high-credibility assertions:  1.) A software component is only as secure as 
the layer beneath it. For virtual computing, that means that if the VMM or hypervisor is 
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not secure, than none of the hosted VMs are secure. 2.)  The smaller and simpler a 
software component is, the fewer vulnerabilities it will contain, and the easier it will be 
for developers to find and correct those vulnerabilities prior to release.   
 MILS-based virtual computing environment would thus employ a very simple 
“micro” separation kernel, functioning as a bare-metal hypervisor. For application to an 
aircraft’s avionics, this hypervisor would also have to be optimized to support 
deterministic real-time processes in the hosted VMs. (Small kernel size and real-time 
capability are not mutually exclusive in any way; if anything, they tend to go hand-in-
hand.)  This underlying layer would contain no device driver’s specific to the VM’s 
above it, keeping it simple and easier to certify. It would be designed to enforce the 
following security policies to assure that system events (or intrusion) in one hosted OS 
could not spread laterally or upstream:   
• Data isolation, which ensures that a partition cannot access resources in 
other partitions 
• Periods processing, which ensures that applications within partitions 
execute for the specified duration in the system schedule 
• Information flow, which defines the permitted information flow between 
partitions 
• Fault isolation, which means that a failure in one partition does not impact 
any other partition within the system (Parkinson & Baker, 2011) 
 With that in mind, paravirtualization architecture with a large and complex 
hypervisor atop an ARINC 653 operating system (such as PIKE OS in the Airbus 
A380/A350) would probably not be an appropriate choice where certified “high 
robustness” was a requirement. Firstly, the large size of the kernel would make it difficult 
and expensive to certify. Furthermore, the inter-partition communications permitted 
under ARINC 653 standard may create violations of the MILS information flow policies 
that protect hosted domains of differing security classifications. (Kleidermacher & Wolf, 
2008, p. 1.C.3-5). Pike OS’s inclusion of complex device drivers in the virtualization-
layer for support of various host-OSs also would introduce increased certification 
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overhead; each would have to be evaluated to the same standard applied to the most 
secure hosted application on the system.  
 Various alternate solutions have been proposed; prominent among these is Green 
Hills Software’s Integrity DO-178 RTOS, a micro-kernel-based hypervisor that supports 
time/space/memory partitioning (with no dynamic memory allocation) for safety-critical 
functions AND cross-domain security in a common platform. FAA-certified more than a 
decade ago (IAW the older DO-178B standard) for use aboard the Sikorsky S-92 
helicopter,  the maker asserts that the current version of the software has since achieved 
the official blessing of the NSA’s NIAP lab as a “High Robustness” platform.  
 Hardware support of virtualization also interacts with achieving a balance 
between robust security and high system performance. As previously described, full 
virtualization typically offers lower performance than paravirtualization due to increased 
virtualization overhead; but full-virtualization is inherently easier to make secure 
according to the MILS paradigm. The consensus view seems to be that increasing built-in 
support for virtualization at the hardware level will help close (or even reverse) this 
performance gap. Furthermore, Asymmetric Multiprocessing on MCPs inherently offers 
an additional avenue by which the separation kernel could maintain the integrity of 
partitions. Threads from VMs of differing classifications could be routed to different 
cores, in addition to the separate physical memory blocks, with little or no performance 
penalty. Integrity-series software by Green Hills Software provides this ability when 
installed on MCP devices. The advanced SMP performance scheme utilized by Wind 
River Systems in their VXworks Core 7 product, on the other hand, intermingles threads 
from different partitions during cycle slack-time. This inter-partition resource sharing 
would have to come under close control and scrutiny to assure that only processes from 
the same security-domain level would share a core during a given cycle.  
a. TRL Assessment for High-Robustness Virtualization 
 The most extensively flown RTOS VMM (Pike OS) may provide adequate 
security robustness for present-day civil applications, but in a world of increasingly 
sophisticated cyber-aggression that may not always be the case in the future. Certainly, 
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for the cross-domain needs of a sophisticated war-fighting platform, it is not appropriate. 
Fortunately, a MILS-architecture compliant, NSA-certified micro-kernel alternative has 
already achieved operational status with several aircraft, including the afore-mentioned 
S-92 helicopter and upgrades to the B-2 and F-16. The Green Hills Software product is 
also being incorporated into the F-35 JSF, where its virtualization capabilities are being 
extensively utilized. This fact might lead one to assign a very high TRL level to the 
technology; but our conservative approach dictates a bit more caution. The F-35, as 
advanced as it is, does not achieve full IMA2G-levels of integration, virtualization and 
distribution. Although Integrity DO-178B is likely capable of supporting that type or 
architecture, we have uncovered no evidence that this has been validated outside the 
laboratory environment. As such, we will restrict our rating to Technology Readiness 
Level 4.   
5. Open Standards for Avionics-Grade Military Software 
 The goal of Integrated Modular Avionics is to dismantle the functional stove-
pipes that have historically divided the complex collection of avionics systems in modern 
aircraft. The mismatch of software interfaces involved though makes that task immensely 
more difficult. Besides impeding integration and interoperability, the reliance on single-
platform, proprietary software is considered a major cost-driver within military aviation; 
and there is no reason to suspect that developing, certifying and supporting unique 
imbedded software will ever get significantly less expensive. If anything, increasing 
levels of complexity make the opposite effect more likely. (Reference the NASA study, 
cited in Chapter I). The most widely prescribed solution—supported by both the FACE 
and SCARLETT consortiums—is the development a common, open-architecture for 
aircraft avionics. Such an system would allow “components conforming to agreed-upon 
standards to be added, upgraded, and swapped” and “independent parties to design and 
develop interoperable components that work together under the specified standards” 
(Hagen, Hurt, & Sorenson, 2013, p. 28). It would, in other words, be an application of 
“form, fit, function” on a logical, as well as physical level. 
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 The idea is not new. According to Tom Dubois of Boeing, both the F-22 and the 
ill-fated Comanche helicopter programs initially hoped to leverage some sort of open-
standard, by which different vendors could write software compatible with the system 
and drive down costs through competition. In the time frame during which those two 
projects commenced however, there was no existing framework that would offer the data-
exchange and resiliency capabilities needed. A ground-up standard was developed – with 
hopes that it would become broadly accepted. Market factors and security concerns 
conspired to defeat that hope however, and both aircraft ended up with stove-pipes of 
their own making (T. Du Bois, personal communication, September 25, 2014). For the 
Comanche, the cost of that outcome may have contributed to the program’s demise. In 
some ways, the difficulty of establishing a successful open-standard is a variation of “the 
chicken or the egg” problem; a new product may not be successful unless it is compatible 
with broadly-accepted standards, but a new standard cannot find broad acceptance unless 
multiple products are built upon it. Which must come into being first? The product (the 
“chicken”) or the standard (the “egg”)? 
 The lessons of previously-unsuccessful open-architecture models have apparently 
not been lost on the FVL program. The Joint Common Architecture initiative is an 
attempt to create an open-architecture egg, while simultaneously developing an entire 
flock of new open-architecture chickens to hatch out of it. Just as the aircraft’s physical 
architecture is supported by a lobbying consortium of government, industry, and 
academics (The FVL Consortium), its avionics development has a symbiotic relationship 
with the Future Airborne Capabilities Environment (FACE) group.  
 In November 2014, FACE-members and JMR-TD partners Boeing and Sikorsky 
concluded a four month feasibility study that was essentially a proof-of-concept for the 
FACE technical standard. A sensor-fusion software component developed for the Navy’s 
P-8 Poseidon (a maritime patrol aircraft based on the Boeing 737) was minimally 
modified and then successfully run on different hardware in three other platforms:  a 
Boeing AH-64 Apache helicopter, the Sikorsky S-99 Raider technology demonstrator, 
and a prototype Boeing computer known as Phantom Fusion (Freeburg, 2014). 
Honeywell conducted a similar study, also according to FACE standards. In both cases, 
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the successful result points optimistically to the development of a workable open-
standard for high-assurance military systems.  
 By themselves however two successful, independent laboratory tests do not  prove 
that a FACE-based model can provide adequate real-world performance given the 
limitations of currently available hardware. “Any time you introduce an open system,” 
laments Boeing’s Dubois, “you are introducing extra layers of processing” (T. Du Bois, 
personal communication, September 25, 2014). This is of particular concern with a 
highly-integrated architecture that fuses traditional Mission Systems and VMS functions, 
where performance is critical. An overburdened capacity for real-time processing could 
set limits on the scope of virtualization, especially in the near-term, without the added 
support of multi-core processors.  
a. TRL Assessment for Open Standard Military Avionics 
 The FACE consortium has managed to build apparent momentum behind the 
adoption of an accepted open-standard model for military software systems. Given the 
revolutionary effect that successful open-standards in telecommunications, computer 
networking, and portable-device operating systems have had over the past few decades, 
the development of such a system would be both highly-welcome and long-overdue. 
Thus, far however, the FACE standard consists of little more than some documentation 
and a few proof-of-concept experiments. Based on the findings of our research we will 
assign it a current TRL rating of 4: “Component and/or breadboard validation in a 
laboratory environment” ([ASD[R&E], 2011, para. 2.5).      
6. Model-Based Systems Engineering, Development, and Certification 
 The complex requirements being written into proposals for future aircraft (such as 
FVL) are increasing difficult to comprehend intuitively. Elaborate, document-driven 
frameworks such as DODAF (Department of Defense Architecture Framework, presently 
in its version 2.01 incarnation) have been adopted to help manage this growing problem – 
but there is a growing sense that they are falling short of the task. The need for a model-
based approach was a consistent thread found in every scholarly article and conference 
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proceeding on IMA consulted for this study, and was also universally endorsed by the 
subject-matter experts interviewed. 
 In a June 2013 address to members of the INCOSE (International Council on 
Systems Engineering), Stephen Welby, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Systems Engineering expressed his view that, “we will begin to see simulation become a 
more integrated part of the design process rather than something that is engaged 
separately. I believe we will see the ability to affordably explore much more complex 
design spaces, with the opportunity to better understand how the implication of design 
changes downstream ripples back across an entire product design” (Zimmerman, 2014, p. 
3).  
 Proponents of model-based systems engineering (MBSE) claim that it reduces the 
chance for errors and ambiguities to develop as a project passes through the many stages 
required to translate a broadly-written requirements outline into actual working software 
code. Multiple methodologies of MBSE currently exist, and are defined by variances 
within their processes, methods, tools, and environment (Estefan, 2008, para. 2.1). The 
approach that the FACE consortium is attempting to develop for use on the JCA and 
other embedded software-intensive DOD projects is called the Modular Open Systems 
(MOSA) Data Model. It has been demonstrated in principal but should not be considered 
fully mature. In a November 2014 press-conference, Michael May, the associate director 
for software and embedded systems in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering, cited the pressing need to reinvent the way complex aerospace 
and weapon systems are developed, but confessed that “Some of our methods don’t scale 
well.” (IE: from individual software programs to entire systems). They also rely upon 
programming and formal methods of analysis that are still not the norm in the current 
work force. “The formal-methods guys tend to be PhDs,” May clarified (Freeburg, 2014). 
Left unsaid, but presumably a limiting factor as well is the culture and environment of the 
DOD acquisition ecosystem. It remains to be seen if the good intentions of the FACE 
consortium will actually succeed in bringing about any meaningful paradigm shift on the 
equally important government side of the defense technology industry.  
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 Testing and certification are also areas where model-based approaches may hold 
promise. The current impasse on airworthiness of multi-core processors may be a sign 
that a tipping point has been reached in our ability to adequately test and validate 
complex cyber-physical systems. It has even been alleged that Boeing purposefully held 
back on integration and virtualization in the 787 airliner because they feared certification 
of such an advanced architecture would unduly delay sales (D. R. Arterburn, personal 
communication, January 22, 2015). In order to continue the upward trend of system 
complexity and capability, the pressure is on to reinvent the way we design, test, and 
certify aircraft.  
 Formal recognition of MBSE as a valid approach for demonstrating compliance 
with applicable airworthiness regulations may finally be on its way; 2013 saw the FAA 
release a circular (AC 20–115C ) affirming that the current DO-178C standard could be 
supported via model-based testing. Given the complexity of highly-integrated future 
architectures-- especially those with extensive cognitive-decision aiding, or optionally-
manned control schemes (as planned for the FVL) – there is still a long way to go. 
Current standards are still based on deterministic airworthiness; implying that all possible 
system states and interactions can be known and adequately tested. It is predicted that the 
F-35 will reach operational service with some 24 million lines of code (Charrette, 2012); 
the FVL is likely to be just as complex. Without resorting to some sort of probabilistic 
airworthiness or extensive dependence on computer-based simulation, it is difficult to 
fathom how we will be able to certify such systems in a time and cost-effective manner.  
 The barriers here are likely more cultural than technical. “The flight test guys 
sometimes think we’re trying to put them out of business,”  explains David R. Arterburn. 
(personal communication, January 22, 2015). A more accurate assessment is that the task 
of flight test will be next-to-impossible in the near future without heavily leveraging 
model-based simulation, but live testing will always be required to validate parameters 
for the model. With assurance that the input is valid, developers can then rely upon their 
model environment to run an astronomical set of scenarios in a wholly reasonable time. 
Not only will this simplify certification, it will facilitate the early discovery (and 
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correction) of flaws in a design that might otherwise be accepted because they were 
found too late in the testing process to economically fix.     
 It is important to emphasize that the U.S. government and defense industry is not 
operating in a vacuum with regard to the modeling and simulation issue. SCARLETT 
researchers at the University of Bremen, Germany in 2010, published detailed 
descriptions of model-based testing protocols for advanced IMA systems, claiming that 
“Compared to the manual implementation of tests … this approach promises to reduce 
the effort needed for test development by at least 30% and to avoid errors made during 
the manual implementation of test cases” (Efkemann & Peleska, 2010, para. 3). FVL 
consultant Arterburn confirms that SCARLET may be well-ahead of US-industry in this 
area. “They [European Governments] are investing heavily in this stuff” (D. R. 
Arterburn, personal communication, January 22, 2015). 
a. TRL Assessment for Model-Based Development 
 Our findings indicate the model-based systems development is a rapidly 
advancing field, and one that—by weight of necessity—is likely to become the dominant 
paradigm for aerospace systems design in the coming decade. As evidenced by top-level 
comments from the civilian leadership within the department of defense (Zimmerman, 
2014; Freeberg 2014), change is coming, because it is needed. No matter what 
architecture choice is arrived at for the FVL, the program will benefit on some level; but 
in order to facilitate development of an advanced, common IMA2G avionics suite for 
these aircraft, timely adoption is of pivotal importance. 
 Rating the TRL for model-based development strictly in the context of FACE’s 
MOSA-data model—the system most likely to be applied to the FVL—we find level 7 is 
an appropriate reflection of the current status. “System Prototype demonstration in an 
operational environment.” Though not strictly speaking a part of the technology of highly 
integrated software-defined systems, the relative maturity of this needed faculty lends 
some needed optimism to the other challenge areas described previously.  
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B. IMA2G: MATURITY ASSESSMENT 
 The findings of Technology Readiness Assessment are summarized in Table 5.  
Table 5.    TRL Summary for IMA2G Critical Path Areas 






System/subsystem model or 
prototype demonstration in 
a relevant environment. 
TTEthernet has demonstrated characteristics 
needed to support IMA2G[1].[2] 
Has not been integrated beyond prototype 
applications in an air vehicle.  







breadboard validation in a 
laboratory environment. 
No current MCPs are certified airworthy [4] 
Disabled MCPs are flying without clear 
airworthiness [5] 
Vender Wind River Systems recently promised a 
compliant RTOS that can leverage dual-core 
silicon, but has not yet delivered[6]. 







Analytical and experimental 
critical function and/or 
proof of concept 
Paravirtualization is a mature technology, but 
may not be suitable to military IMA2G[8].[9] 
Hardware-assisted, full-virtualization is tied with 
chip-design, and such products are not yet 








breadboard validation in a 
laboratory environment. 
Integrity DO-178 RTOS offers a MILS compliant 
secure VMM, already certified and in use aboard 
operational military aircraft [9] 
Current Integrity applications do not stress the 








breadboard validation in a 
laboratory environment. 
FACE consortium technical standard continues to 
evolve and has broad industry support[7].[10] 
Independent JCA experiments have demonstrated 
that the proposed open architecture is feasible. 
[11] 
Model-based, 





demonstration in an 
operational environment 
Multiple demonstrations of need/capability/intent 
from both industry and government.[11][12] 
Cultural factors may retard full adoption [7][10] 
1. Kopetz, Ademaj, & Grillinger, 2005 
2. Bisson, 2011 
3. Plankensteiner, 2012 
4. Huyck, 2012 
5. Reported in confidential personal communication 
6. Wlad, 2014 
 
7. D.R. Arterburn, personal communication, January 22, 2015 
8. Fuchsen, 2009  
9. Kleidermacher & Wolf, 2008  
10. T. Du Bois, personal communication, September 25, 2014  
11. Freeburg, 2014  
12, Zimmerman, 2014 
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 Overall, it may seem that the low ratings (averaging only 4.7 on a scale of 1–9) 
paint of bleak picture for the short-term prospects of second-generation IMA. It should be 
kept in mind however that the technology areas listed in this portion of the study 
represent critical path items in the development of such a system. It is not inclusive of 
the many mature or nearly-mature technologies that would also be leveraged in a notional 
IMA2G design. Had we listed our identified challenge-areas alongside all these other 
low-risk items, the outlook naturally appear much more optimistic. Since a 
developmental system can easily be derailed by its weakest link however, we feel the 
picture as described in the following table is the better one from which to formulate a 
recommendation. 
C. IMA2G IMPACT ON FVL ATTRIBUTES 
 As outlined in chapter II of this study, the Future Vertical Lift program ICD sets 
out a broad set of highly ambitious requirements. In this section, we will assess the 
potential impact of a fully-realized IMA2G architecture on individual aspects of those 
requirements, as well as the relative potential for a less-integrated system to achieve those 
same thresholds.  
1. Aircraft Performance/Payload/Range 
Table 6 lays out a stark comparison between the performance threshold expected of the 
medium-weight FVL variant and one of the more avionics-weight-challenged challenged 
aircraft it would one day fulfill the role of, the U.S. Navy’s Sikorsky SH-60B.  
 
Table 6.   FVL-medium and SH-60B performance compared 
 Speed (cruise) Combat Radius Payload (int/ext) Passengers 
SH-60B 120 (max range) 80 nm* 600-3000 lbs 1-2 
FVL-M 230-300 kts 265 nm* 6,000-20,000 lbs 11-24 
* Defined as unrefueled distance w/2.0 hr loiter (full combat load at 6k/95°) 
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 Though the size, weigh, and power-consumption (SWAP) benefits of a more 
efficient, integrated avionics package are not enough to deliver the required 
improvements on their own, they could make a significant contribution – both on their 
own, and synergistically.  
• Reduced Avionics Size:  increases the volume of internal fuel that can be 
carried, increasing range, and on-station endurance. If those benefits are 
sufficient to eliminate the need for external fuel for certain missions, the 
increased speed may be realized through reduction in drag, or increased 
armament/payload can be carried.  
• Reduced Avionics Weight:  Improves rate or climb, top-speed, and range. 
In Helicopters, contributes to better hover performance and controllability 
under hot/heavy/high conditions. Also, more fuel can be carried, (internal 
or external) increasing range. Payload (external/internal) and armament 
also can be increased.  
• Reduced Power Consumption:  Reduces size/weight of generators/power-
supply busses, wiring, and cooling systems required, contributing to 
range/speed/payload/armament improvements. Reduction in parasitic drag 
on engines to run generators may also contribute slightly to performance. 
Alternately, these small benefits could be traded in for greatly increased 
excess power-capacity for high-draw weapons and sensors. 
• Synergistically:  reduction in all three aspects of size, weight and power in 
on-board avionics have a ripple-effect across the entire airframe, allowing 
for more efficient packaging, and reduced design-penalties for the 
delivered capabilities. 
 The ability for first-generation IMA to deliver size, weight and power  savings  
has already been discussed in this work. The 2014 report by Mairaj and Tahir 
demonstrate that size reductions on the order of 28% to 50%, weight reductions of 25% 
to 50%, and power-consumption reductions of 38% to 60% are possible when 
transitioning to from a federated-systems model to an IMA-based model. There is 
abundant cause to speculate that a second-generation IMA avionics suite would improve 
significantly on those already-impressive figures. However, since there is no flying 
example of true IMA2G architecture at this time, no equivalent data exists to validate that 
hypothesis, much less quantify it statistically. For the purposes of this study we will 
adhere to a conservative estimation, assuming that the adoption of fully-developed 
IMA2G avionics and mission-systems will realize SWAP improvements in the FVL no 
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greater than the upper-bounds already reported in the Mairaj and Tahir paper: 50% size, 
50% weight, and 60% power consumption.  
 Just how much of a real-world performance improvement would those figures 
translate to for an FVL rotorcraft? As discussed previously, that will depend largely upon 
the ratio of avionics weight to aircraft empty weight. In an attempt to estimate what that 
ratio might be for an FVL-medium variant (which will probably be the most numerous 
derivative), we have compiled data from a 1981 Rand Corporation study that included a 
breakdown of avionics weight for various then-current U.S. combat aircraft. Added to the 
list is corresponding empty weight and avionics weight for the SH-60B Seahawk 
helicopter, which was introduced to service around the same time as the Rand study was 
conducted. Columns B through D in Table 7 represent the as-is state for complex, 
federated-systems military aircraft of varying sizes. Note that the percentage of total 
empty weight represented by on-board avionics is highest in the SH-60B, at 14.6%. With 
a 50% reduction in weight accomplished through advanced IMA (remember, a 
conservative figure) that percentage would decline to 7.9% (Column F), reducing the 
overall aircraft empty-weight by a very significant 7.3%.   
 If 100% of the weight shed (nearly a thousand pounds) were to be translated 
directly into a corresponding quantity of extra onboard fuel, the increase in range would 
significant. According to type-model NATOPS manual, the SH-60B normally carries 
approximately 3000 lbs of fuel; enough to support 3.5 hours of total endurance, or a 80 
mile transit, with a 2 hour on-station time, and 80 mile return. Adding 996 lbs of internal 
fuel would allow for a 140 mile two-way transit with the same 2 hour on-station time. In 
other words, notwithstanding any aerodynamic gains made though the FVL’s proposed 
compound-helicopter or tilt-rotor layout, just building the aircraft around a IMA mission-






Table 7.   Avionics as percent of empty weight: Federated vs. IMA 
A  B C D E F G H 
  As-is  IMA2G ( with 50% weight-reduction in 
avionics) 
















F-14A [1] 38,900 2,199 5.7% 1,099 2.9% 37,801 2.8% 
F-15A [1] 25,800 1,580 6.1% 790 3.2% 25,010 3.1% 
F-111D [1] 46,800 2,354 5.0% 1,177 2.6% 45,623 2.5% 
A-4M [1] 10,800 840 7.8% 420 4.0% 10,380 3.9% 
SH-60B 
[2][3] 





Dryden, Britt, & Binnings-Depriester, 1981, p. 29 
Polmar, 2001, p. 389  
NAVAIR, SH-60B NATOPS manual  
Does not include weight of FLIR/Hellfire package (add 700+lbs) 
 
  If the FVL airframe turns out to be capable of delivering the required 
range improvements without carrying extra onboard fuel, that weight and space saving 
could be traded toward other performance enhancements, including speed, 
maneuverability, hot/heavy/high hover ability, and cargo/weapons payload.  
a. Impact Assessment for Performance/Range/Payload 
 Given the high percentage of aircraft empty weight likely to be devoted to 
avionics in a complex multi-mission platform like the FVL-medium,  the projected 
SWAP gains of IMA2G (upwards of 50% for size, 50% for weight, and 60% for power-
consumption) are likely to be highly significant to aircraft performance. Likewise, the 
consequence of attempting to achieve the desired multi-mission capability without 
resorting to a highly-integrated avionics architecture is likely to be highly detrimental. In 
other words, communications, sensors or weapons, would have to be traded for speed and 
range, or vice versa. With fully-realized IMA2G, the trade-off would be greatly reduced.  
 53 
 In accordance with this study’s findings, we rate the impact of advanced IMA on 
achieving the desired performance characteristics of the FVL program as strongly 
positive.  
2. Mission Capability/Flexibility 
 FVL program attributes and outcomes associated with Joint Forces (JFOR) 
Mission Capability/ Flexibility include the following: 
• The ability to integrate and rapidly configure a mixture of “multiple Joint 
weapon types” 
• Advanced Sensors that combine “multi-spectral, multi-function … 
targeting, navigation, and aircraft survivability equipment” and the ability 
to operate at night and in degraded visibility. 
• Enhance Situational Awareness through various data-links that 
automatically send/receive information and help build a common 
operating picture, including “threats, inclement weather, and other hazards 
encountered enroute.” 
• Fully integrated crew station to enable “mission focused operation” while 
providing for “automation of critical battle tasks, cognitive decision 
aiding, and decision making, [and] fused sensor imagery.”  
(US Department of the Army [USA], 2011, p. 3) 
 The total picture that emerges when looking at the above requirements is of an 
extremely complex aircraft with numerous sensors, communication systems, weapon 
systems, and a centralized management capacity for the interpretation and presentation of 
information. What would happen if an attempt was made to integrate such advanced 
capabilities into an existing airframe without resorting to an advanced IMA architecture ? 
(Assuming it is even possible to design a system like this under the federated model.)  As 
it turns out, we have a perfect experimental case to answer that very question:  the MH-
60R – which is now replacing the SH-60B in service with the U.S. Navy. While the 
“Romeo” certainly succeeds in upgrading the weapon suite, sensor reach, data-link 
capability, and cockpit presentation of the legacy platform is has supplanted, the 
corresponding increase in empty weight is illustrative. 
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 Table 8.   Avionics complexity and aircraft weight; SH-60B to MH-60R  
 SH-60B MH-60R 
Empty Weight 13,648* [1] 15,200 [2] 




NAVAIR SH-60B NATOPS manual 
NAVAIR MH-60R NATOPS manual 
Does not include weight of FLIR/Hellfire package (add 700+lbs) 
 
  Essentially, the MH-60R features the same airframe as the SH-60B. Indeed the 
first LRIP (Low-Rate Initial Production) batch of “Romeos” were built from existing 
60B, 60F and 60H airframes. The weight growth shown in Table 8, is almost all 
attributable to either 1.) avionics systems growth, or 2.) airframe reinforcement and 
auxiliary support systems designed to accommodate that avionics growth.  
 As capable as the MH-60R is with regard to multi-mission flexibility, weapon 
employment, and sensor-fusion, it represents only the current state-of-the-art, and falls 
well-short of the corresponding characteristics described in the FVL ICD. By 2035, the 
FVL’s intended IOC, the “Romeo” will be as moribund and obsolete as the SH-60B is 
today. To add the capabilities called for in the FVLFOS ICD without an advanced IMA 
architecture would add even more weight to an aircraft that is already reaching the upper 
bounds of what the airframe and powerplants can support.    
 That argument may be academic however, as the type of automation, information-
sharing, and in-flight reconfiguration called for in FVL documents may be all but un-
achievable without a software-defined approach to system integration.  
a. Impact Assessment for Mission Capability/Flexibility 
 Not surprisingly, our findings indicate that successful development of an 
advanced IMA2G architecture for the FVL Family of Systems would have a strongly 
positive impact on achieving program thresholds for mission capability and flexibility. 
Any attempt to achieve greater sensor-fusion, weapon integration, or battle-space 
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awareness over the current MH-60R multi-mission maritime helicopter would likely 
result in severe SWAP consequences.   
3. Manpower/Training 
 The optimal manning required to maintain a military aircraft at the desired level 
of operational availability varies with the characteristics of the aircraft in question. 
Airframe size and complexity play a key role, but the electronic and avionics architecture 
is also highly influential, particularly when FMC (Full-Mission-Capable) rates are 
considered. Although the concept of the LRU was supposed to simplify field 
maintenance, in reality, a complex federated architecture requires a large footprint of 
maintenance manpower.  
• Large number of individual physical components and connections between 
them create numerous potential points of failure.  
• Software and hardware are tightly coupled, making it difficult to isolate 
whether a fault is in one or the other. 
• Built-In-Testing (BIT) on LRUs does not span system wide, resulting in 
ambiguous results and unnecessary replacement is order to chase faults. 
• Depot-level maintenance requires numerous specialists to effect repairs on 
unique LRU components. 
• Lack of commonality between federated platforms favors specialization 
over generalization, resulting in a larger maintenance manning footprint. 
 The first commercial developments of IMA meanwhile were sold as much on the 
basis of reducing that heavy maintenance footprint as they were on SWAP 
considerations. IMA in general, and advanced IMA in particular, directly addresses all 
the previously described causal factors that inflate the maintenance-manning 
requirements of a federated-systems fleet. The mechanisms for that enhanced efficiency 
are as follows:  
• Reduced number of unique hardware components and fewer connections 
and junctions in-between, resulting in limited physical points of failure. 
• Software and hardware faults are inherently easier to separate in an IMA 
scheme. 
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• Advanced, autonomous, system-wide conditional-monitoring can isolate 
and announce faults before they even become apparent to operators.  
• Fewer physical components in the avionics system means fewer specialists 
required at the depot-level. 
• System commonality across platforms allows a single qualified maintainer 
to work on multiple airframes with equal competence.  
 This last characteristic is particularly germane to the FVL program. A forward-
deployed force pays a logistical premium for maintenance manpower; and vertical lift 
aircraft are often deployed to austere locations where security, supplies, and even shelter 
are limited. When two avionics technicians at a small FOB (Forward Operating Base) can 
do the job of three or four, or when one technician can work on multiple FVL types, the 
benefits are particularly manifest. In operational terms, a manpower reduction of this 
order – with no corresponding downgrade to capability – means that the FOB has a 
lighter logistical footprint to support and can thus hold out longer between resupply 
missions.  
 Advanced IMA architectures would also be likely to use more commercial, open-
source software to deliver common, non-tactical functionality – as opposed to proprietary 
military programs. Greater convergence between skill sets utilized in the military and 
civilian spheres broadens the pool of experienced technicians, and can be leveraged to 
motivate both recruitment and (to an extent) retention of military technicians. This may 
be mitigated perhaps by the higher level of knowledge and education required, but in the 
long term, such an effect would be in-line with the apparent U.S. societal trend toward 
increased educational requirements for employment. Without doubt, young people 
entering the work force today are more comfortable and conversant with software-driven 
systems than any previous generation—to say nothing of those entering the work force in 
2035!  (Of course it remains to be seen however whether that high-level familiarity 
actually translates into functional understanding.)  
 Operator training and manning meanwhile, may also benefit from adoption of a 
common IMA architecture across the FVL Family of Systems. Shared cockpit interfaces 
enable easier cross-platform type rating. Optionally-manned capabilities (which would be 
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far easier to implement in an IMA2G architecture) could reduce the number of human 
pilots and aircrewmen required – at the very least be taking on routine maintenance or 
ferry flights. The ability to operate instances of mission software fully abstracted from 
hardware and linked by a common virtual environment opens the possibility of using an 
FVL aircraft as a full-function tactical simulator for deployed forces. A crew could 
practice for an upcoming mission, participate in a battle-group war-game, or even catch 
up on their yearly instrument approach minimums without ever leaving the ground. 
Limited aircraft maintenance (daily and turn-around servicing for instance) could even be 
conducted at the same time on a non-interfering basis. Later, after the mission was 
actually flown, data collected and fused from the on-board network of embedded systems 
could be used to re-construct events, aircraft performance and crew actions in rich detail.  
a. Impact Assessment for Manpower/Training 
 As a result of the reduced physical complexity, but increased logical complexity 
of IMA systems, fewer maintenance personnel will be needed, but for those that are 
retained, a higher (more software-focused) level of expertise will be called for. This may 
have both positive and negative repercussions for military technician recruitment and 
competition against private-sector employers, but overall, the balance is likely to be in 
favor of IMA. 
 On the operational training aspect, advanced integrated systems offer many 
possibilities to make more effective use of pilot/aircrew time and enhance 
training/readiness. As a result, we assess that IMA2G is likely to have an overall positive 
effect on manpower considerations for the FVL program.  
4. Development Timeline 
 Application of any novel technology (or in the case of IMA2G, several novel 
technologies) carries inherent schedule risk. Earlier in this chapter, we assessed the 
overall Technology Readiness Level for advanced IMA architectures as approximately 
4.7 on a scale of 1–9. This limited state of maturity of increased the probability of 
unknown-unknowns emerging during the course of system development.  
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 Given novel airframe architecture(s) proposed for the FVLFOS however, it 
cannot be taken for granted that delays with avionics will be the critical path that causes 
overall schedule slippage. An instructive parallel might be Boeing’s development of the 
787 Dreamliner. Company executives launched the program in January of 2003, with 
intent for first deliveries by the end of 2008 – assuming it would take just six years to 
design, build, test and certify the new machine. This aircraft’s fully-fledged First-
Generation IMA architecture represented a very large advance over the previous 
transitional IMA applied to the company’s 777 airliner; but the aircraft also employed 
extensive use of composite construction that was without precedent for an aircraft of its 
class. The confluence of these two factors make it difficult to sort out which one 
(avionics or airframe) was predominantly responsible for the three-year schedule slip in 
actual customer deliveries.   
 IOC for the FVL-Medium variant (the first to be fielded) is 2035. Given that Joint 
Multi Role Technology Demonstrator (JRM-TD) prototypes should have completed their 
fly-off competition by the end of 2018, the projected timeline allows for twelve years of 
further development. Compared to almost any other similar program (with the possible 
exception of the notoriously tardy V-22 Osprey) this seems like a generous schedule.  
 Moreover, the extremely high-level of complexity inherent to an advanced 
IMA2G architecture in a multi-mission tactical aircraft makes model-based design and 
testing a virtually inescapable necessity. All subject matter experts contacted for this 
study agree firmly on that point. This forced transition is likely to make progress more 
difficult at first, but if advocates of MBSE are right, it will pay significant dividends in 
the long-term, greatly streamlining the development process. Given the long-term scope 
of the FVL, the program is likely to benefit from that effect eventually – perhaps even 
enough to make up for initial delays.  
 Another factor to be considered is the ease with which open-source, COTS, or 
legacy software components could be integrated into an advanced IMA2G system. This 
characteristic is one of the most heralded advantages of IMA2G, and has the potential to 
radically streamline avionics capability development. As noted previously in this chapter, 
experiments with the FACE consortium’s technical standard for Modular Open Systems 
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Architecture (MOSA), have already demonstrated the feasibility of cross-platform 
software re-use.  
a. Impact Assessment for Development Timeline 
 On the whole, it is difficult to predict the impact of IMA2G architecture on the 
FVL program. Due to the novel (and as-yet undetermined) airframe construction, the 
immature, but rapidly-developing state of required technology, and an on-going paradigm 
shift within Government and Industry, any projection would be highly speculative. The 
relative speed and success of the transition to model-based development, and MOSA will 
strongly impact the schedule of the FVL program; but investing in a heavily-integrated 
IMA architecture is more likely to force these issues.  
 Since equal potential exists for IMA2G adoption to delay or enhance the FVL’s 
acquisitions schedule, we assess the impact as neutral/indeterminate for the purposes of 
this study. 
5. Total Life-Cycle Costs 
 Many of the same characteristics of IMA that would positively impact 
maintenance manning would be reflected in reduced life-cycle expenditures. It stands to 
reason that a system with fewer physical parts, fewer redundant, duplicated capacities, 
and greatly reduced wire count would also be less expensive to maintain and repair. Each 
LRU in a federated-systems model (and a single function require many LRUs) represents 
an tightly-coupled integration of hardware and software, and testing program to validated 
it. It is not unreasonable to expect that a system with 90% fewer LRU’s would be 
significantly reduce maintenance and upgrade costs.   
 Achieving enhanced efficiency in software development and integration is of 
course, one of the major factors driving IMA and advanced second-generation IMA. 
Avionics contractor Honeywell, for instance, claims to have reduced software costs 20% 
for the avionics suite onboard the Boeing 777 ER (http://www51.honeywell.com/). In 
particular, the high degree of software re-use possible with a heavily virtualized avionics 
computing environment would seem to open the gate to very impressive savings. In 
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general, it costs the same to develop a particular software package irrespective of how 
many aircraft that software ends up installed in. Clearly, if a single software capability 
can be re-used across multiple different aircraft, entire development programs can be 
reduced to mere integration efforts. That integration itself becomes immensely easier the 
more abstracted the software runtime environment is from the underlying hardware. 
Much of integration testing, after all, involves the quest to discover and eliminate adverse 
interactions between component and another (hardware or software). The isolation of a 
“guest” operating system within a virtual environment can help contain those 
interactions.  
 Furthermore, an FVL aircraft equipped with IMA2G avionics might well be able 
to integrate obsolete legacy programs supporting sensors, communications or weapon 
systems introduced decades earlier; just as one might run an obsolete version of Windows 
in a virtual machine on one’s personal computer to allow a superseded application to run. 
This could take what might have otherwise been a long and costly integration program 
and greatly reduce the time and expense. 
 Of course, public funds expended in developing software for military aircraft are 
merely the tip of the proverbial iceberg. According to a recent U.S. Air Force study, 
“software sustainment activities (i.e., O&M plus upgrades) can account for 60–90% of 
the total life cycle software costs”(USAF Science and Advisory Board [SAB], 2011, p. 
75) and those costs are trending strongly upwards. The same report found that 
expenditures on software maintenance “nearly doubled over the past decade (an increase 
from $483M in 2002 to $841M in 2011)” (SAB, 2011, p. 74). and predicted they would 
continue to climb over the next two decades as highly software-dependent aircraft like 
the F-22 and F-35 enter the sustainment phases of their life-cycle.  
 Again, there is little difference in the costs to maintain a particular software 
configuration item whether it is used in one aircraft or many. Any reduction in the 
number of unique software programs used across the FVL fleet would help contain 
sustainment costs. If extensive virtualization means that software and hardware can be 
upgraded separately and independently, the ease of upgrading FVL variants during their 
life-cycle would also be enhanced. It might also lead to more competitive market 
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conditions among vendors and bring down prices. Contrast this to the current 
circumstance where the DOD typically finds itself held hostage to a single supplier of an 
obsolete processor or software item. Often times, the vendor may be forced by economic 
factors to discontinue the product, leaving that particular military system vulnerable to 
widespread service outage.  
a. Impact Assessment for Total Life-Cycle Costs 
 Few matters in business or government are as contentious and often-exaggerated 
as the potential for long-term cost savings. Despite the preponderance of claims that 
advanced IMA architectures will be less expensive to upgrade and maintain over the life 
of an aircraft, there is little present evidence in the public domain to quantify that. Recall 
that even the initial generations of IMA architected aircraft have not yet reached the back 
half of their service lives, where maintenance and upgrade costs are likely to be highest. 
Furthermore, most of these planes are operated by profit-driven, publicly-traded 
corporations, who are understandable tight-lipped about the actual monetary figures 
involved. Thus, all we are left with is expansive sales pitches from manufacturers – who 
can hardly be expected to present a sober and restrained sales-pitch. Even if the massive 
cost-efficiencies promised by IMA vendors and advocates turn out to be achievable, the 
initial cost of entry into state-of-the-art technology cannot and should not be ignored.  
 That being said, our findings indicate little reason for outright pessimism. Viewed 
strictly in the long term, we find there is reason to expect that IMA2G would indeed carry 
a positive impact on life-cycle costs for the FVLFOS. This might be partially mitigated in 
the short and medium-term however by larger up-front costs, but the FVL program as a 
whole is large enough to support such costs, and long enough in scope to reap the 
rewards.  
6. Enhanced Safety and Survivability 
 In the first six years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 375 rotary 
wing aircraft were lost as a result of enemy fire, aircrew mishap, or mechanical failure 
(Couch & Lindell, 2010, p. 9). To what extent could adoption of software-defined 
avionics help enhance the flight safety and combat survivability of Future Vertical Lift 
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aircraft? As it turns out, there are multiple aspects where IMA2G could have a positive 
impact: 
• More armor/protection. As previously shown IMA2G would save 
considerable weight. Every pound of avionics and wiring saved could be 
replaced with a pound of additional armor and countermeasures. 
• Greater performance margin. Alternately, weight savings from IMA2G 
could mean a lighter, faster, more maneuverable FVL, better able to evade 
enemy fire, and more resilient to the hazards of mountain-flying. 
• Enhanced resiliency. An IMA2G architecture could distribute critical 
avionics functionality across several decentralized servers, running 
parallel software instances. Battle damage or power failure to one server 
rack would result in seamless “failover” – or transfer of processing 
responsibility to the alternate server.     
• Enhanced awareness. IMA2G supports the integration of numerous, 
advanced sensors (at reduced SWAP penalty) to detect threats, and present 
them to the pilots and aircrew in an intuitive, helpful manner.  
• Cognitive decision aiding/Assisted piloting. Centralized fusion of data in 
IMA allows for the possibility of effective cognitive assistance for the 
pilot, reducing mental workload in challenging and stressful situations. 
Since an IMA2G FVL rotorcraft would have all the underlying 
characteristics of an optionally manned aircraft, (whether it was 
designated as such or not) the machine could take over vehicle 
management and respond dynamically if the pilot was incapacitated or not 
responding correctly to flight-envelope warnings.  
 Any one of these improvements would be welcome on their own; taken together, 
the synergistic effect may be even greater than the sum of the individual parts.  
a. Impact Assessment for Safety and Survivability 
 It should be emphasized that despite all these potential advances, FVL aircraft 
will still be required by the nature of their missions to fly low, slow, and in close 
proximity to threats on the ground or the ocean surface – and often in the hours of 
darkness or in poor weather. In other words, even with the full suite of IMA2G-enabled 
survivability enhancements described above, flying a military helicopter will never be 
safe.      
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 That being said, our findings indicate with a high degree of confidence that 
IMA2G would have a strongly positive effect on the relative safety and survivability of 
FVLFOS aircraft. 
7. UAS Interoperability 
 Interoperability has been a strong selling point for vendors of military equipment 
ever since the Goldwater-Nichols Reform Act of 1986 ushered in the modern era of 
“Jointness” for the U.S. armed forces. In recent years, the focus of interoperability has 
grown in scope to include the ability to work with autonomous or unmanned military 
platforms. This has led to a new, high-visibility concept:  manned-unmanned teaming, or 
MUM-T. A U.S. Army-led initiative to develop a standard Joint MUM-T interface is 
(not-coincidentally) co-located with FVL program activities at the Redstone Arsenal in 
Huntsville, Alabama. Though the programs are not formally connected, there are clearly 
common threads of effort. The FVL ICD states that “applicable FVL FoS platforms must 
control unmanned systems up to a Level of Interoperability (LOI) 5” (US Department of 
the Army [USA], 2011, p. 3). According to the latest revision of MUM-T standards, LOI 
5 entails “Full control of the UAS, including take-off and landings” (Baxter & 
Eschenbach, 2014). 
 The latest version of the Boeing’s Apache attack helicopter, the AH-64E 
Guardian has been extensively upgraded with IMA-style mission systems, and is now 
capable of supporting LOI 3 “Control of the camera and sensors on the UAS” and even 
limited LOI 4 “Control of the flight path and payloads” with several common tactical 
unmanned aerial vehicles. A full IMA2G implementation on the FVL may not be 
necessary to achieve the desired level of interoperability, but it will greatly facilitate it. 
There is, after all a large capability gap between limited in-flight control of a UAV, and 
full mission-teaming from take-off to landing. Software-defined avionics supports the 
information sharing, data-fusion, and cross-domain functionality required to make the 
most of such an arrangement. Additionally, the common virtual environment that would 
form the backbone of manned FVL variants would be identical to that found on 
unmanned or optionally-piloted variants; strengthening the connection.  
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 Whether or not it is designated as such, any FVL aircraft built atop an advanced 
IMA architecture would have all the inherent characteristics of an optionally-piloted 
vehicle. The fact that all or nearly all mission-system, navigation and VMS controls 
would be part of an integrated, software defined (and thus software-controllable) system, 
places the pilot in the position of decision executive vice integrator-operator. Separation 
of physical I/O from avionics functions means that those executive-inputs could just as 
easily come from an external data-link, or from the aircraft’s own autonomous central 
control authority as from switches and levers in the cockpit. Manned aircraft based on 
federated systems can be turned into drones – we have been doing so for decades with 
obsolete fighters used for missile tests – but not with level of sophistication needed to 
operate as an integrated combat or ISR asset. IMA2G would allow any FVL to turn into a 
UAS, in the field – or even in the air – as necessary. No physical modification of the 
airframe or avionics would be required; rather than mere interoperability, such an 
architecture would establish interchangeability between manned and unmanned systems. 
a.   Impact Assessment for UAS Interoperability 
 Our findings indicate unequivocally that there is a strong alignment between 
advanced IMA architectures and teaming/interoperability with unmanned platforms. For 
the purpose of this study we assess the impact as strongly positive.  
8. FVL-IMA2G Impact Study Summary 
 Table 9 summarizes the alignment and impact comparison between FVL program 
goals and IMA2G attributes. In general, we find the potential benefits of IMA2G 
architecture to be supportive or strongly-supportive of nearly all FVL mission goals – 
even those that only tangentially involve aircraft avionics. The only area we examined 
that was not robustly and conclusively supported is timely development. Although 
several associated aspects of IMA2G (reduction of unique hardware, open-source 
standards for software, model-based systems engineering, etc.) may contribute in the long 
term to a more efficient acquisition path, the complex nature of the 
technical/organization/cultural barriers that must first be overcome precludes us from 
being overly optimistic in our assessment.  
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Supports aircraft empty weight reductions of  7% or more. 
Synergistic effects contribute to reductions in weight, and drag of the entire aircraft. 







Software-define avionics may be required to achieve advanced capabilities for 
sensor fusion, weapons integration, and partial automation specified in FVL program 
ICD.  
Attempts to achieve desired functionality without advanced IMA will be result in 
excessive SWAP for mission systems, and thus compromise performance goals. 
Manpower/ 
Training 
Positive IMA2G should facilitate maintenance and reduce manpower footprint.  
Reduced maintenance manpower may be partially off-set by a requirement for more 





Remaining technical challenges will take time to overcome. 
Complex requirements will take time to validate and test 
Complexity factor partially or wholly mitigated by adoption of model-based systems 
design, testing and certification.  
Open source development of mission software may speed up design cycle.  
Reduced Life-
Cycle Costs 
Positive IMA systems easier and less-expensive to upgrade/maintain 
Open source development can increase competition between vendors or allow 
repurposing of existing or COTS program. 





IMA2G avionics allows resiliency and fault-tolerance greatly exceeding Federated 
Systems. 
IMA2G supports integration and sensor fusion for advanced counter measures, and 
cognitive decision aiding. 
IMA2G is easier to upgrade with new software/hardware, allowing the FVLFOS to 
keep up with development of anti-aircraft weapons. 
UAS Teaming Strongly 
Positive 
The sharing of a common avionics systems architecture between manned and 





 Taken as a whole, the material presented in the Chapters II and IV of this study 
leads to several distinct conclusions. First, the prevalent trend within the avionics 
industry is Integrated Modular Avionics, with technology and competitive pressure 
favoring the emergence of advanced IMA2G-like architectures within the next 5 to 10 
years. These architectures will be distinguished from current state-of-the-art systems by 
high degrees of virtualization and extremely limited hardware specialization. They will 
employ multi-core processors, high-speed deterministic Ethernet, and will be designed, 
tested, and certified using a data-model-driven paradigm. The convergence of functional 
domains in these second-generation IMA designs will reduce (or in some case, eliminate) 
the gap between manned and unmanned platforms.  
 From our alignment comparison in Chapter IV, it is clear that key attributes and 
outcomes of the Future Vertical Life program are strongly supported by the projected 
benefits of the IMA2G technology. As a consequence of this fact, as well as the 
marketplace trends described previously, system architects are already attempting to 
incorporate IMA2G-like technologies into the Joint Common (avionics) Architecture for 
the FVL.  
 So where do these intermediate conclusions leave us in our assessment? Is it 
already a foregone conclusion that the FVL will employ software-defined mission-
systems with converged VMS? We have already established that the ambitious 
requirements written into the FVL ICD make IMA2G a natural fit, but is there anything 
outside those explicit requirements that might counter-indicate that choice? Have we 
considered, for instance, the sum-total attributes that a fleet of such aircraft would display 
in operational service? Are there any objectionable second or third-order effects that may 
result from these attributes?  If so, how might these effects be countered or mitigated 
against? The remaining portion of this thesis will be dedicated to proposing speculative, 
but well-grounded answers to these questions, and stimulating further research. 
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1. Is IMA2G inevitable? 
 In the long-term, our findings indicate no reason to believe that the current trend 
toward increasingly software-defined avionics will abate or reverse. This forecast 
progression will eventually lead to flying IMA2G-like architectures in production civil 
and military aircraft. That being said, it is not certain yet to what extent the FVL program 
will participate in, or contribute to that trend. In our interview with Boeing JCA architect 
Tom Du Bois, he stressed that development efforts are purely experimental and 
conceptual at this point – meaning that a great deal could change. The Joint services 
could, for instance, decided to scale back some of the more technically ambitious 
wording in the FVL program documents, allowing room for a less-integrated, off-the-
shelf solution to the identified capability gaps. To offer one example, scaling back the 
UAS interoperability requirement to Level 4, (limited in-flight and mission package 
control), is already achievable with partial IMA in refitted AH-64 Apaches. If the 
requirement to build unmanned and optionally manned variants with the same common 
avionics architecture is also relaxed or omitted, it would greatly reduce the amount of 
system-wide integration and abstraction required. Second-Generation IMA might not be 
necessary at all.  
 In light of the pervasive technology trend evident in the avionics industry (and 
elsewhere) toward converged, software-defined systems, it may not be wise, however, for 
the FVL program to bypass this emerging paradigm. The life-cycle of major military 
systems has grown steadily longer in past decades, in spite of the apparent acceleration of 
consumer technology advances. Where once the nation’s defense relied upon the cutting-
edge systems that were well-beyond anything available to the general public in terms of 
sophistication, the situation has utterly reversed itself now. The recent push for 
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technology adoption for DOD applications has as 
much (or more) to do with performance as it does with cost-savings.  
 An argument can be made that military technology must of necessity follow a 
more conservative path than consumer products, as the security, reliability, and 
survivability requirements for military applications are much, much more stringent. 
Allowing front-line aircraft to lag excessively behind the state-of-the-art in terms of 
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computing power and network technology could have severe consequences for the cost of 
support and service-life extensions though. It is not difficult to envision a scenario in 
which the first operational FVL variants reach squadron service in 2035 with basic IMA 
architectures comparable to what Boeing and Airbus were delivering to their customers 
twenty-five years earlier. In that case, the DOD might find itself as the sole remaining 
customer for outdated processors and network technology. Since foreign military sales 
will no-doubt be an important success-metric for the FVL program, one must ask how 
competitive such rotorcraft might be vis-à-vis, European or Asian-designed IMA2G 
aircraft? Indeed, opting for fully mature technology in the Joint Common Architecture 
seems sensible and conservative now, but by the mid-century mark, we could well regret 
that decision.  
2. Operational Effects 
In order to project meaningfully upon the operational impacts of advanced IMA in 
future rotary wing assets, it is necessary to embrace the totality of the picture and 
consider the characteristics of the end product:  the aircraft itself. There will be some 
aspects of IMA2G technology itself that have direct consequences; but many others will 
simply be an effect of the capabilities that IMA2G allows. If the latter seems like an 
unwarranted digression in an otherwise technical analysis, it can be argued that decisions 
on military technology should always be made with knowledge and forethought of 
possible second-order effects. Doing otherwise risks opening new capability gaps even as 
we succeed in closing existing ones.  
A wider systemic view is essential. An aircraft like the FVL (with or without 
IMA2G technology) must function as a component of other, larger systems. Upgrading 
and enhancing one component of a complex system often creates new points of strain or 
limitation elsewhere. There is no doubt that a Joint force fleet of IMA2G-equipped FVL 
rotorcraft would offer impressive capabilities and address many of the shortfalls and 
limitations of current (federated-systems) helicopters, but those enhanced capabilities are 
likely to shift points-of-failure elsewhere. If known in advance or anticipated, the ripple 
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effects of implementing new technology can be planned for and mitigated. Waiting for 
such effects to actually materialize before considering the impact, however, is ill advised.  
As an outgrowth of our research on the technology of software-defined avionics 
and mission systems, we have developed several matrices of operational and tactical 
impacts, likely consequences or ripple-effects (both positive and negative), and proposed 
mitigation strategies where appropriate. The list is in no means exhaustive; yet exploring 
each item in detail would still be beyond the scope of this study. Our purpose in including 
them is purely to suggest further lines of research, and perhaps paint a more 
comprehensive view of how we see advanced IMA taking the DOD’s rotary wing fleet in 
the future. Our speculations will be further refined in an operational vignette to follow.   
a. Extended Aircraft Availability 
In Table 10, we compare the obvious positive operational consequence of higher 
mission-availability rates, with the less-obvious (but no-less significant) second-order 
effects of that increased availability. The underlying assumption is that commanders will 
continue to utilize all, or nearly all, of the available rotary-wing services at their disposal 
– even as that notional capacity increases.  
The primary concern here is that the human element (both aircrew and support) 
will be stretched dangerously thin. This hazard must be considered particularly probable 
in the context of pressure on the DOD to reduce its manpower footprint. Making a value-
based decision on airborne services versus manpower costs is essential here:  if the Joint 
services benefit from increased value-per-dollar expended on rotary wing aircraft (due to 
increased reliability/decreased maintenance), they must be prepared to pay for at least a 
portion of that added value by supplying sufficient human capital to sustain the desired 
op-tempo. If human costs are deemed prohibitive beyond a certain point, then the only 
sustainable long-term solution is to give up some of the potential benefit. IE: cut back 
flight hours to fit the new limiting factor: personnel.   
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Table 10.   Operation impact:  extended aircraft availability   
IMPACT/CHANGE                  Increased aircraft availability and FMC Rate 
POSITIVE 
CONSEQUENCES 
• Fewer aircraft required to meet mission, reduces total 
procurement cost and footprint of deployed force.  
• Operational planning less constrained by aircraft 
availability.  
• Enables reduced maintenance manning, and 
component replacement costs. 
• Aircraft are safer to operate, with fewer in-flight or 
on-deck aborts due to equipment failure. 
ADVERSE 
CONSEQUENCES 
• Increased availability puts aircrews at additional risk 
for fatigue if crew numbers are not increased 
proportionately. 
• Enhanced op-tempo puts additional strain on ancillary 




• Be prepared to increase aircrew manning in near-
proportion to the improvement in FMC rates. 
Deployed units already operate at or near safe margins 
for crew day/ crew rest.  
• Consider adjusting air-capable ship manning to enable 
sustained 24 - 7 flight support for rotary wing assets 
(manned and unmanned). 
 
b. Enhanced Mission Capability 
 Table 11 projects that the combination of IMA2G-based mission systems agility, 
UAS interoperability, and the increased range, speed, and payload of the FVL platform is 
likely to generate new or expanded mission-sets for the rotary-wing fleet. Helicopters 
currently make up over 50% of the total aircraft in the Joint service inventory – compared 
to less than 20% for fixed-wing attack/strike aircraft. (“U.S. Military Strength,” 2015) It 
is reasonable to expect that FVL variants, especially the medium-lift platform, will also 
be built in large numbers. Assuming a reasonably successful development program, this 
should bringing FVL per-unit costs down relative to comparably advanced fixed-wing jet 
aircraft, which almost-surely be purchased in smaller quantities. This fact opens up the 
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possibility that certain force-application missions that have traditionally been associated 
with such assets may begin to migrate to newly-capable vertical-lift aircraft. Even if they 
are judged less-effective at those missions on a per-aircraft-sortie basis, their greater 
numerical availability, along with their capacity to work closely with tactical drones, and 
their reduced reliance on well-developed airfields or aircraft carriers will make them an 
attractive alternative in many cases.  
Table 11.    Operational impact: enhanced mission capability 
IMPACT/CHANGE                  Broadened mission-capability, flexibility, outreach 
POSITIVE 
CONSEQUENCE 
• Operational planners less constrained by available 
assets, since aircraft can be reconfigured via software 
for specialized mission support. 
• New sensor-fusion ISR and communication 
capabilities for Joint Forces resulting in higher SA for 
both aircrew and commanders near the tactical edge 
• Ability to rapid adopt new communications paths, 
sensors, or weapons as they become available 
ADVERSE 
CONSEQUENCE 
• Capacity for multi-mission flexibility may further 
erode specialty skills of aircrew. “Jack of all trades, 
master of none” scenario. 
• New mission sets may evolve for rotary-wing assets 
in competition with existing capabilities, leading to 
inter- and intra-service rivalry. 
MITIGATION 
STRATEGY 
• Consider longer duration initial fleet tours for aircrew 
to allow for extended experience with multiple 
mission-types. 
• Review and re-align as mission-sets for advanced 
rotary-wing platforms at appropriate to their 
newfound capabilities. 
• Leverage the mission-equipment-as-tactical-simulator 
concept enabled by IMA2G to assist in proficiency for 
deployed crews  
 
  On order to make best use of available aviation components, including the 
FVLFOS, we anticipate the need for a serious review and/or realignment of mission 
priorities for various platforms. It seems likely that a projected future of limited wars, 
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counter-insurgencies, and proliferated anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) weapons will 
favor the flexible capabilities of advanced rotary-wing aircraft, closely teamed with 
unmanned, or optionally manned platforms.   
 Of course, the inherent capability of a given aircraft to fly of a multitude of 
missions does not mean that the majority of its crews are competent to execute 100% of 
those missions 100% of the time. The reality of personnel rotation, work-up cycles, and 
fiscally constrained budgets for training virtually preclude this from being the case. In the 
largely-bygone era of single-mission military aircraft, pilots and crewmen could 
concentrate their training and experience on a particular, narrowly defined skill-set, 
usually achieving a high degree of competency as a result. Modern crews of multi-
mission platforms do not have that luxury. Though they generally have assistance from 
on-board automation to help make up for their lack of specialist competency, they are 
still required to remain cognizant of a very broad spectrum of tactics, techniques and 
procedures. At a certain point, as mission-sets continue to expand and diversify, a tipping 
point could easily be reached. Again, the limiting factor becomes the human element. 
 Cognitive decision aiding and partial automation are proposed within the FVL 
ICD to help address this “weak link” in the cockpit. Both of these services are robustly 
supported by an advanced IMA2G system, but there is perhaps an additional way that 
software-defined avionics could help: by ensuring that aircrews are better prepared for 
their missions in the first place.  
 High-fidelity tactical simulators have already proven their worth as a training tool 
and are in many cases supplanting actual flight hours for maintaining readiness. Due to 
their cost and large logistic footprint however, they are generally in short supply, and 
never available in deployed environments. But what if every fleet aircraft could function 
as its own simulator? With access to the latest theatre intelligence, aircrews could  
rehearse real-world missions, experiment with different tactics, and then actually launch 
on the sortie and fly it. Afterwards, if deemed useful, the mission could be re-flown based 
on recorded data.   
 The highly-abstract nature of IMA2G makes this a very real possibility. Most 
avionics and mission-systems functions would exist as hosted virtual machines on the 
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server network, with their only connection to I/O and effectors provided through the 
services of the hypervisor. A special mode could be enacted in which the hypervisor re-
routed the majority of those outbound messages to a hosted simulation program. Loaded 
with the scenario of choice, the program would define the virtual world that the other 
hosted aircraft systems would “see.” From the aircrew’s perspective, cockpit 
functionality would be identical to what they would experience in an actual flight. 
External visuals could be provided (optionally) by a kit of deployable projection screens, 
and multiple aircraft and UAV’s could be linked together to practice cooperative tactics. 
(See Appendix A for a notional depiction of this set-up.)  Minor maintenance and 
servicing could even be accomplished concurrently with the simulator event, in order to 
assure the aircraft was ready to launch immediately afterwards. Alternately, airframes 
that are currently grounded for repairs might in some cases still be usable as simulators, 
providing value even while not available for flight ops.    
c. Manned/Unmanned Aircraft Convergence and Teaming 
 Of course, any discussion of human pilots as a “weak link” in an otherwise 
highly-capably airborne system begs a further question:  why put a warm body in the 
cockpit at all? Certainly, for some missions—especially those falling under the 
description of “dull, dirty, or dangerous”—unmanned systems are probably the best 
choice. In a fully-developed future battle-space however, the more likely scenario is close 
teaming and interaction between UAVs and manned aircraft. MUM-T, as previously 
described, is strongly supported by advanced IMA mission-systems architecture. In Table 
12, we list some of the prominent advantages that might be gained by the convergence 
and teaming of manned and unmanned FVL variants, and the down-stream effects could 
possibly develop.  
 Contrary to the starry-eyed optimism envisioned in the DOD’s Unmanned System 
Integration Roadmap (2013), we do not feel that the increased utilization of UAVs to 
provide round-the-clock aerial services is a silver-bullet solution to the Joint services 
current manpower concerns. In the context of optionally piloted FVL variants, the cost-
per-flight hour is likely to be exactly the same whether the craft is manned or not. The 
 74 
decision of what mode to employ it in must be driven by factors other than cost-
containment.  
 Employment of optionally-manned rotorcraft must also be considered in light of 
adversary perceptions. Opposing forces under surveillance by FVL aircraft will often 
have little way of knowing whether or not there is a human crew on board, and the 
assumption (one way or the other) could mean a radically different reaction. Shooting 
down a drone might be considered an acceptable escalation of current tensions, whereas 
attacking a manned aircraft would not; thus a drone might be protected by the perception 
that it could be manned. Conversely, a manned crew could be targeted based on the 
mistaken belief that their aircraft is “just a drone.” 
Table 12.   Operational impact:  manned/unmanned convergence/teaming 
IMPACT/CHANGE      UAS Teaming / Convergence of Manned/Unmanned Systems 
POSITIVE 
CONSEQUENCE 
• Powerful force multiplier. Enables extended air-
mission coverage. 
• Enables new tactics that will reduce risk to manned 
aircrews while still extending high-quality support for 
CAS mission and OTH-T.  
• Human crews can be “saved” for missions that 
significantly benefit from their presence. Missions 
that are just-as-well conducted autonomously or 
remotely need not be manned. 
• Optionally-piloted aircraft provide a unified asset – 
with common maintenance support – for both manned 
and unmanned missions.  
• The manned or unmanned status of optionally-piloted 
FVL aircraft will be opaque to potential adversary 
forces. They may be more reluctant to engage the 
aircraft due to the perception of more severe 




• Additional round-the-clock strain on aircrews due to 
the need to supervise unmanned FVL mission in 
addition to manned sorties. 
• Reduced flight hours and actual “stick time” erodes 
basic aircrew competency and Esprit d’Corps. 
• Without aircrew-driven limits, commanders will 
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IMPACT/CHANGE      UAS Teaming / Convergence of Manned/Unmanned Systems 
demand 24-hour flight operations, straining support 
services like maintenance, ATC, and flight-deck 
crews.  
• Planners may be tempted to supplant qualified pilots 
with less-expensive, junior personnel for unmanned 
FVL missions; loss of experience may result in poorer 
mission performance. 
• A manned aircraft may be targeted on the assumption 
that it is “just a drone.” 
MITIGATION 
STRATEGY 
• Be prepared to increase aircrew and support-crew 
manning in order to support 24/7 flight ops. 
• Develop new TTP for UAS-manned aircraft teaming, 
established firm policy guidance on what mission-sets 
require on-board human crew for execution. 
 
d. System Software Complexity 
 Software and overall system complexity is a fact of life for modern aircraft, and 
IMA2G architectures will be far more complex than anything flying today. The open 
question is whether the cleverness of the system’s open-architecture and MILS-compliant 
foundation will be enough to help mitigate (or even reverse) the adverse consequences of 
that logical complexity, or whether it will only make things worse. One way or another, 
robust security needs to be fundamental to the design of the FVL’s mission-systems; not 
merely assumed away or added on afterwards as a patch.  
Table 13.   Operational impact: system software complexity 
IMPACT/CHANGE      Software Complexity, Functionality and Authority 
POSITIVE 
CONSEQUENCE 
• Software-driven functionality will be easier to 
upgrade during vehicle life-cycle, allowing rapid 
capability evolution 
• Aircraft will be capable of providing autonomous 
support to human crew, reducing workload in critical 
combat situations. 
• Every onboard function can be tracked and 
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IMPACT/CHANGE      Software Complexity, Functionality and Authority 
monitored; feeding into proactive condition-based 
maintenance, and maintenance-availability-based 
sortie planning. 
• Aircraft will be easier and safer to fly at the margins 




• Need for advanced skill-set to troubleshoot problems 
with IMA2G aircraft avionics could make front-line 
Joint forces more reliant on expensive contractors for 
support. 
• In the event that an FVL aircraft is captured by a 
sophisticated adversary, the enormous quantity of data 
on board, much of it stored in open-source COTS 
applications may be a significant liability.  
• Near 100% of aircraft functionality, including flight 
and weapon systems will be potentially vulnerable to 
malicious code implanted by a sophisticated enemy. 
• A malfunctioning or enemy-corrupted full-authority 
IMA system could take control away from the human 
crew with tragic and devastating consequence. 
MITIGATION 
STRATEGY 
• Include a requirement for a hard-disconnect option in 
the JCA to restore manned control in the event of 
corrupted autonomous or external control.  
• Ensure capacity exists within the system to 
conclusively (and remotely) wipe all classified and 
mission data from on-board aircraft memory in the 
event of imminent capture by adversary forces. 
 
B. OPERATIONAL VIGNETTE 
 The following is a hypothetical scenario in which the presumed characteristics of 
an FVL aircraft with software-defined mission systems is imagined in a potential 
operational environment. The FVL variant in question is an optionally-manned multi-
mission maritime version in U.S. Navy service. The presumed time-frame of this scenario 
is the late 2030’s; several years the aircraft has reached IOC. The backdrop of events is a 
rapidly escalating territorial dispute in the Western Pacific over energy exploitation and 
fishing rights. 
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1. Scenario Background   
 Seeking an alternative method to realize territorial claims rejected by the rest of 
the international community, Country Orange has apparently resorted to arming and 
assisting separatist rebels on an island chain bordering disputed shoal waters. The Brown 
Islands are a recognized archipelago of Country Green, and most inhabitants of its major 
population center consider themselves loyal citizens of Country Green. Country Orange, 
however, claims ethnic and historical ties to an oppressed minority population in the 
southwestern third of the archipelago. Six months ago, the Brown Islands were struck by 
a severe typhoon, providing Country Orange the pretext to establish a humanitarian naval 
and air mission to the rebel-dominated portion of the archipelago. Since then, hostilities 
between the rebels and Country Green forces have escalated rapidly. Western intelligence 
sources suggest that Country Orange is providing military weapons and training to the 
otherwise isolated rebels, in addition to food and relief supplies. Country Green suspects 
this as well, and has openly accused Country Orange of fomenting revolution on the 
archipelago. Recently, a Green corvette near the Brown coast was destroyed by a 
suspected light-weight anti-ship cruise missile fired from a shore-based TEL 
(Transporter, Erector, Launcher). Rebels claimed responsibility, but all signs point to 
Country Orange as the supplier of the missile system.   
 In order to help arrest further hostilities and deter Country Orange from 
undertaking overt military action in support of the Brown Island Rebels, the U.S. Pacific 
Command has dispatched a combined joint task force to the region. As part of that task 
force, the guided-missile destroyer USS Chris Kyle, DDG-123, is currently sailing off the 
western edge of the brown Archipelago. Embarked aboard the Kyle is a two-plane 
detachment from Vertical-Lift Maritime Strike Squadron Five-One (VMS-51) – the 
“Warlords” – out of Iwakuni, Japan.  
2. Phase I: Ops Normal 
 Date:  March 29, 2039 
 Time:  1645L (0845Z) 
 Location: 70 NM WSW of Goat Island in the Brown Archipelago. 
 Threat Warning Condition:  Yellow 
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 Weapon Control Status:  Tight 
 Warlord 710 flew a rock-steady approach to the back of the USS Chris Kyle, 
touching down and dropping its landing probe dead-center in the Recovery & Securing 
Device (RSD) “trap.” It was just the sort of landing one would expect from a well-
seasoned crew on the back-end of a long deployment. Except for one small detail…  The 
cockpit and cabin of Warlord 710 was presently unoccupied.  
 Detachment Four Officer-in-Charge (OIC)  “JD” watched the recovery from the 
right seat of the Det’s other aircraft, Warlord 704, orbiting a quarter-mile off. Tough act 
to follow, he thought to himself. The only way of really competing with the smoothness 
of an automated FVL approach was to add a little style; come in fast, flare at the last 
minute – and hope you didn’t “goon it up” and make a fool of yourself. Most of the time 
he managed to pull that off pretty convincingly, but then again, his first fleet tour had 
been spent wrestling overweight, nervous-handling conventional helicopters onto small 
decks like this—without the benefit of fly-by-wire controls or the safety-net of an 
automatic approach mode.  
 Those old MH-60Rs couldn’t fly their own functional check-flights (FCFs) either, 
come to think of it—which was exactly what Warlord 710 had just done. After a few 
minutes of spinning on deck, the unmanned aircraft shut down and began folding its 
rotors. JD’s aircrewman aboard 704, AW2 Stout, who had been monitoring the other 
aircraft’s flight via secure data-link, keyed the ICS. “Looks like 710’s up FMC Boss. All 
Vibe runs and final grounds are within limits.”     
 “Roger,”  JD replied, nodding. “I guess we’re going to have an alert aircraft 
tonight after all.” 
 “Sir, I was kind of hoping we wouldn’t,”  Stout replied with his usual excessive 
candor. 
 “Me too.” JD agreed. Things had been certainly been heating up lately in this 
AOR. Back in November, the Kyle and Det Four had been sent down here to support 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations in the Brown Archipelago. 
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They had no idea at the time that they would be back just a few months later, getting shot 
at.    
 Well strictly speaking, JD clarified to himself, we didn’t get shot at, Warlord 710 
got shot at.  
 Two nights ago, while flying an autonomous ISR flight in the vicinity of Goat 
Island, 710 had taken small-arms fire from a rebel gunboat. Reacting as quickly to the 
threat as any human pilot could have, the self-flying rotorcraft had managed to get away 
safely, but returned to the ship with a gaping hole from a 12.7 mm machine gun in one of 
its rotor-blades. Replacing that blade had driven the FCF today; and now, after two 
unmanned vibration runs, the machine was back up and available for tasking.  
 The same could not be said, unfortunately, for the Detachment Maintenance 
Officer. “Squirrel” was currently laid up with fractured a bone in her left hand. She had 
fallen down a ladder well on the ship while rushing to inform her OIC that 710 had been 
fired upon. That left JD as the only qualified AC (Aircraft Commander) on the four-pilot 
det.  
 Given the recent spate of hostilities, the captain of the Chris Kyle had insisted that 
the Detachment fly an armed overwatch mission to cover 710 during its FCF runs—
which was the only reason why JD was airborne at the moment. The majority of action 
around Goat Island, including the covert intrusion of Country-Orange vessels into Green 
territorial waters to supply arms to the rebels, happened only under the cover of darkness.  
 JD glanced over at the empty seat to his left. Taking advantage of 704’s single-
pilot mode, with its “virtual co-pilot” service,  he had been able to spare his two nugget 
pilots the boredom of a daytime drone-escort mission; that way, they would be fresh for 
tonight’s alert, and could remain on the nocturnal schedule they had already adapted to. 
As for himself and AW2 Stout, his goal was to be on deck as soon as 710 was folded and 
stuffed inside the port hangar.  
 “Green deck,” JD announced over the ICS. Up ahead in the distance, he could 
make out the green deck status light on the Kyle; but he needn’t have looked up from his 
instrument console to know that he had been cleared to land. The four MFD’s (Multi-
 80 
Function Displays) in front of him currently showed everything he needed to know, 
including the deck-status. Courtesy of the KU-band data-link with the destroyer and the 
attentive services of his virtual co-pilot, he had the ships BRC (base recovery course) 
dialed in, as well as a continuously updated read-out on such factors as closure-rate, 
winds-over-the-deck, and pitch and roll.  
 “Hal-704,” JD annunciated into the mike, summoning his voice-activated virtual 
co-pilot by its programmed sobriquet. “Landing Checklist: shipboard recovery.” 
 At once, the NATOP checklist for landing operations appeared on one of JD’s 
MFDs, and a faultlessly calm, computerized voice began methodically reading checklist 
items. On cue, JD either performed the listed step, or issued a verbal reply, prompting 
“Hal” to do it himself. At the end of the checklist, the computerized co-pilot confirmed 
that winds over the deck were within limits and landing gear was down and locked.  
 Approximately ninety seconds later, Warlord 704 crossed the deck-edge and 
alighted securely with its probe in the RSD.  
 “Try to beat that one, Hal” JD mumbled to himself.  
 “Please repeat your last,” replied the automated voice, apologetically. “I did not 
understand your request.” 
 “Disregard Hal 704,” JD instructed. “Initiate autonomous hand-over checklist.” 
 As the Det Four OIC and AW2 Stout unstrapped, Warlord 704 began preparing 
itself for its next mission. Tonight, a SEAL platoon was going ashore via submersible 
delivery vehicle to scout for (and hopefully neutralize) the Orange-supplied mobile 
ASCM launchers with which the rebels had been attacking Country Green shipping. 704 
would provide armed overwatch and continuous surveillance throughout the night. If all 
went well, the SEALS would hit their target and egress the same way they had come 
before sunrise. Until then though, Warlord 710—and a human crew—would be on 30-
minute alert for an airborne extraction.    
3. Phase II:  Mission Preparation 
 Time:  1830L (1030Z) 
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 After dinner in the wardroom, JD rounded up his two nugget pilots and the 
aircrewmen that would be sharing the night’s alert mission with him. After checking in 
with the ship’s Tactical Action Officer (TAO) in the Combat Information Center (CIC), 
and watching a few minutes of live sensor feed from Warlord 704, they conducted their 
own mission brief and headed to the hangar. Per JD’s instructions, Warlord 710 was 
already set up with the Det’s DIVTAC (deployable integrated virtual tactical simulator) 
kit, and a simulated mission emulating an opposed SEAL extraction from Goat Island 
was loaded and ready to go.  
 A wealth of recent all-source intelligence and fused sensor data from the Navy’s 
“Big-Data” tactical cloud ensured a high degree of fidelity in the simulation model. JD 
flew two ingress and egress runs apiece with each of his nuggets in the space of just 40 
minutes, experimenting with various routes to and from the LZ (Landing Zone). Based on 
the simulation results, he concluded that his odds of getting feet-dry for the pick-up 
without being detected were better than 50–50. Getting back out again however, was 
going to be a bit tricky. By the end of the last run, there were tracers arcing all over the 
computer-generated night sky, and JD’s co-pilot, Flo, was working hard to evade.  
 “You think there’s really going to be that many of them shooting at us,” she 
asked.  
 “This is just a worst-case scenario,”  JD dismissed calmly. “Don’t worry about 
it…Too much.” 
 Satisfied that that his crew was ready, the Det Four OIC called an end to the 
simulator session. “Get some rest everybody. There’s going to be a whole lot of hurry-up-
and-wait before dawn.” 
4. Phase III:  Alert Upgrade 
 Time:  2330L (1530Z) 
 
 The first four hours of this alert period went by as expected: quietly. It was not the 
first time Det Four had been tasked with such “hurry up and wait” tasking in support of 
SOF forces in the Brown Archipelago; and they usually ended up sitting on the bench 
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while army rotorcraft from the 160th SOAR (Special Operations Aviation Regiment) got 
the actual sortie. JD had no inkling yet that tonight would be any different, so after 
Warlord 704 returned for fuel and re-launched autonomously, he grabbed a workout mat, 
stretched out on the flight deck, and fell asleep under the stars.  
 Not long before midnight, Flo suddenly shook him awake. “JD!, JD!  Sir!” the 
lieutenant junior-grade spoke in a frenzy. “We just got upgraded to a ready-five!” 
 Jarred instantly from his stupor by the announcement,  JD leapt to his feet and 
snatched up his yoga mat. A moment later, the port hangar door began to open, and the 
clamor of busy sailors spilled out onto the flight deck.  
 “Gear up,” he instructed Flo. “I’ll be back in a minute.” 
 As JD rushed past Warlord 704, still folded and stuffed in the hangar, he noticed 
that the DIVTACS kit was still installed and activated. Now though, instead of acting a 
simulator, it was linked to the Warlord 710, and the images projected on the deployable 
view screens were live feed from the other aircraft’s onboard cameras. In theory, 710 
could be remotely piloted from the cockpit of her sister-aircraft, through the medium of 
the Kyle’s data link, but right now, it was only functioning as a secondary monitoring 
station. The primary mission-control station was in the Combat Information Center (CIC) 
– and that was where JD has headed now, grabbing his helmet and vest as he went. 
 “Looks like the SEALS are having trouble making it back to their sub 
rendezvous,” explained Squirrel as JD and the ship’s TAO leaned over her shoulder in 
CIC. “Too much heat.”  
 “I can see that,” agreed JD. The sensor feed from Warlord 710 was up on 
Squirrel’s console. There was clearly a firefight in progress on the coast of Goat Island. 
Glowing arcs of tracers were crisscrossing over the tropical beach.  
 “Captain in Combat,” someone announced. A moment later, the CO of the Chris 
Kyle joined JD, Squirrel and the TAO. The commander’s first question was about the 
TELs; he wanted to know if the SEALS had managed to take them out.  
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 “Negative Sir,” answered the TAO. “They found them, but they can’t get there 
right now.” 
 “What about 704?” asked the captain. “It’s armed. Can we use it to hit the 
launchers?” 
 Squirrel field that question:  “Out of range Sir. 704 had to stand back when she 
started taking AAA and MANPAD fire.”   
 “How far out are we?”  asked JD. 
 “32 nautical miles from the beach,” said the TAO. “Just outside the range of those 
cruise missiles.” 
 “Until those TELS are down, that’s as close as you’re getting,”  stated the captain 
with a glance toward JD.  
 “I’ve got missiles on the rail on 710, ready to go,” JD replied. “All I need is the 
word.” 
 “Unfortunately, that’ll have to come from the Admiral,” shrugged the captain.  
 JD wasted no further time in CIC. Squirrel was already busy uploading the 
additional intel and mission information onto Warlord 710’s avionics servers. By the time 
the Det Four OIC was strapped in, the aircraft was configured for dual-piloted flight, and 
waypoints determined on the basis of the earlier simulation run were up on the navigation 
screen. The old saw “Fight like you train” had rarely found more literal expression.  
 JD’s copilot tonight—aside from the omnipresent virtual one imbedded in the 
avionics server—was the det’s most junior aviator, Flo; but the OIC didn’t consider that 
fact a liability. A fresh set of eyes in the cockpit could sometimes be a vital asset, 
especially when backed up by some experience in the right seat, and the unblinking eye 
of technology imbedded in the aircraft’s smart systems.  
 Stuck in CIC with her broken hand meanwhile, Squirrel couldn’t pass up the 
chance to tease her fellow JO (Junior Officer) over the data-link. 
 “Ready to be a hero, Flo-Baby?” 
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 Flo got her right back without missing a beat. “Maybe if you weren’t such a klutz,  
you’d be sitting here instead of me tonight. But anyway, I’m sure Hal’s got my back.” 
5. Phase IV:  Launch the Alert! 
 Time:  0012L (1612Z) 
 With the aircraft spotted and spread on the deck, and the alert checklist complete, 
things got quiet for a few minutes aboard Warlord 710. Thanks to the live feed of video 
and data from Warlord 704, JD and his crew already had a remarkably clear and detailed 
tactical picture of the operating area on their MFDs, complete with blue-force position 
indicators for the SEAL platoon, and tracks for the cruise missile TELS.   
 “Look – the TELS are on the move,” Flo pointed out. “They’re buggin’ out.” 
 JD nodded, watching the vehicles line up in a convoy and start to drive slowly 
westward. It was exactly the scenario he had programmed into his simulation earlier. He 
knew already that if the launchers managed to reach the jungle-covered highlands seven 
miles up the road, they would be very difficult to root out;  but if he could launch right 
now, there was still time to engage those TELS and meet the SEALS at their back-up 
extraction point. They had just practiced it in the DICTACS.  
 As if on cue, a new message popped up in the secure command chat that JD was 
monitoring on one of his ancillary screens:  “CJTF says: Launch Warlord 710,”  it read. 
A few seconds later, the tactical controller echoed the command over the data-link voice 
channel. By then the crew was already working their checklists through Hal to start the 
engines and prepare for take-off. While they were waiting for the ship to turn into the 
wind and pass green deck, JD noticed another, follow-on message from the CJTF Battle 
Watch. “Sniper helos directed to neutralize TELs on Goat Island prior to SEAL 
extraction. 160 SOAR is avail for p/u  of team in 40 min if required.”  Sniper, was the 
local callsign for the USS Chris Kyle, of course. JD grinned to himself as the deck status 
light turned green. It looked like he was going to get the opportunity to translate his 
simulator run into reality after all. Let’s try not to goon this was up so bad,  he thought to 
himself silently. 
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 “Gauges green, ready to lift,”  he announced calmly. Second later, Warlord 710 
was airborne and headed East.  
6. Phase V:  Flexible, Lethal, Survivable.  
 Time:  0018L (1618Z) 
 Warlord 710 skimmed the moonlit waves at just 25 feet AGL (above ground 
level) and over 300 knots—a performance enabled as much by the aircraft’s advanced 
automated terrain/collision avoidance system as by its agile airframe. Shortly after take-
off from the Kyle. JD’s crew had managed to establish direct link with Warlord 704, 
currently in a 6,000 ft orbit off the coast of Goat Island. Now the two aircraft re-
synchronized their tactical data and began automatically pooling their sensor information 
to create a fused tactical plot. Using cross-fixed ES (electronic support) bearing-lines 
from each aircraft’s receivers, anti-aircraft and coastal warning radar installations on the 
island’s west side were pinpointed. An overlay of their predicted coverage areas 
continuously updated as JD and his crew continued inbound.  
 Advances in modular software and virtual “black boxes” meant that the Warlord 
aircraft had an EW (electronic warfare) suite functionally equal to the now-retired F/A-
18G Growlers. Suppression of maritime air defenses was even a mission that their crews 
were required to train to, usually as part of team with another rotorcraft flying in 
autonomous mode. Tonight though, JD preferred to evade  the rebel’s air defenses, rather 
than confront them directly. Instead of anti-radiation missiles on his stub-wing rails, he 
had a load-out of eight short-range Griffin-C dual-mode IR/Laser air-to-surface missiles, 
and a twenty-millimeter gun pod.       
 With the multi-spectrum night-vision system built into his helmet-mounted cuing 
system, JD could soon see the craggy profile of Goat Island becoming visible in the 
distance. Via com-relay through Warlord 704, he also had secure voice contact with the 
SEAL platoon leader.  
 “We’re at LZ Bravo,” announced the Navy frogman. “We broke contact, but 
they’ll be on us again soon. Say ETA.” 
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 “Warlord 710 will be overhead in… two minutes, thirty seconds,” JD answered, 
consulting his tactical display. “Engaging the TELs en-route.” 
 “Good luck!  Their running for it.” 
 Thanks to some close coordination between Flo in the left seat, AW2 Stout at the 
sensor-operator station, and Squirrel back aboard the Kyle,  the shot was already set up. 
While 704 maintained surveillance over the TEL convoy from a safe stand-off range,  
710 would swing in low and hug the rugged coast-line of Goat Island. Masked by terrain, 
710 would fire a volley of Griffin-C missiles once in range, which would automatically 
climb to altitude, and hopefully pick up the laser energy from 704’s target designator. At 
that point, they would arc back down toward the road, lock onto the heat-signature of the 
vehicles and go into IR mode for terminal guidance.  
 The “shot fans” on JD’s moving map tactical display made lining up for the 
complex shot easy. At his command, Flo triggered the first shot. A Griffin missile burst 
off the left-hand rail with a sound like a shotgun going off. It immediately climbed 
skyward, reporting its status back to 710 through a simple, high-speed data link.  
 “Missile away. Good link.”  Flo reported, excitedly. “704 has it now…  Good 
laser energy…” 
 “Fire two.”  JD directed.  
 Flo triggered the next shot. Five seconds later, the third Griffin followed, and five 
seconds after that, a fourth missile was airborne. By time the last weapon left the launch 
rail, the first weapon had already struck its target. Three more closely spaced explosions 
lit up the night sky in rapid succession.  
 Flo called the hits over the ICS, but there was no time to confirm if all the TELS 
were destroyed. That could wait for later; every byte of data from both aircraft was being 
recorded for later playback anyway. Right now, Warlord 710 had other matters to 
attended to; namely, getting to LZ Bravo on-time for their overhead.  
 Per the plan they had worked out earlier that night in the DIVTACS session,  the 
crew of 710 picked up their next waypoint, and directed 710 to provide covering fire in 
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autonomous mode. The landing zone was in a small jungle clearing some distance from 
the shore; it looked exactly the way it had in the simulator. After a quick reconnaissance 
pass, JD slowed Warlord 710 and dropped below the treeline. Before his wheels even 
touched down in the grass, a group of dark shapes emerged from the underbrush and 
rushed toward the waiting rotorcraft. In quick succession, all eight SEALs jumped 
aboard. 
 “Clear!”  Yelled AW2 Stout into the ICS from the door-gunner position. Without 
delay, JD pulled in power and executed a rapid no-hover take-off. Apparently though, it 
was not rapid enough. Just as they shuddered their way through translational lift and 
rotorcraft’s pusher fans started applying forward thrust, a tracer the size of a Forth-of-
July rocket cut right across the windscreen. That definitely wasn’t small-arms fire! 
 A second later – before JD could even react – the whole airframe resounded with 
a sharp, brief impact. Every MFD in the cockpit went black for a fraction of a second, but 
then came back on-line.  
 “Break Left!” commanded the normally calm voice of 710’s automated copilot 
over the ICS. JD didn’t question the call – even if it was from an software program. He 
raked the aircraft over on its side and pulled hard. For a moment, as the dark-green mass 
of jungle rushed up to greet him through the cockpit window, he thought he could feel a 
guiding hand adjusting his control-inputs—just like one of his flight instructors at NAS 
Whiting Field might have on an early contact flight. “Reverse turn,”  Hal advised again a 
second or two later. Another huge tracer flew by harmlessly.  
 A large explosion lit up the jungle behind and below them and a few moments 
later, the robotic voice over the ICS announced   “Threat clear. Proceed on course” 
 Not sure what had just happened, but positive that they had just survived a very 
close call, JD let out a tense breath and turned westward toward the first waypoint on 
their egress route.  
 “Thanks Hal,”  he mumbled into the microphone. 
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 “Please repeat your last,” replied the automated voice. “I did not understand your 
request.” 
7. Phase VI:  High-Fidelity Debrief 
 Time:  0505L (2105Z) 
 Almost four hours after recovering Warlord 710 and 704, there was still a curious 
crowd milling about the Kyle’s hangar bay. The DIVTACS kit had been set up again (this 
time on 704) and the night’s mission over Goat Island was being replayed now for 
perhaps the fifth time. Everyone on the ship apparently wanted to get a look; including 
the captain, who insisted on sitting in the left seat and having JD explain every last thing 
that had happened from launch to recovery. By switching back and forth between the 
recorded viewpoints of both 710 and 704, a comprehensive reconstruction of the 
engagement had been quickly pieced together, indicating with a high degree of certainty 
that all of the TELs had been destroyed. Of course, official confirmation of that would 
have to wait until the intelligence cell at CJTF completed their own analysis of the 
mission data, but in the meantime, some other interesting facts had come to light.   
 To begin with, the reason the DIVTACS was set up on 704, instead of 710 was 
that the latter aircraft—the one JD and his crew had been flying in—had a rather large 
hole in the fuselage from a 23mm anti-aircraft shell. The mobile gun system that had 
fired that round was neutralized moments later by an autonomously launched Griffin 
missile from 704. The entire incident was a stunning example of the survivability 
provided by the rotorcraft’s advanced, software-defined mission systems. Warlord 710’s 
Avionics Stack I (its primary avionics server) had been totally destroyed by the anti-
aircraft shell; and yet the aircraft had suffered no pilot-perceptible loss of functionality. 
The secondary avionics server “Stack II” had been running parallel instances of all flight 
and mission applications, and when “Stack I” dropped-off the network, failover to those 
parallel instances was immediate and seamless. In the seconds following the event, the 
system was even able to help guide JD’s break-lock maneuver with verbal advisories and 
outer-loop control inputs. That had been a close one. Lidar-altimeter data indicated that 
they had been less than ten feet from slamming into the ground at one point.  
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 Thoughts of that seat-clenching moment were turning over again in JD’s mind as 
he finally escaped the hangar and bay and walked out onto the flight deck to watch the 
sun rise. Flo was outside as well, doing the same thing.   
 “You remember what you told Squirrel last night before we took off?” JD asked 
after a few casual words. 
 “About being a klutz?”   
 “No – about Hal having your back.” 
 “Oh, yeah,”  Flo nodded. “I guess he had both of our backs, didn’t he?” 
 “With a copilot like that, I might even survive the rest of this tour of flying with 
nuggets like you.” 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. IMA2G – ARCHITECTURE OF CHOICE FOR THE FVL 
Despite the risks of immature technology and organizational resistance along several 
critical paths, our findings indicate that IMA2G is an overwhelming a favorable model 
for the FVL’s joint common architecture. It supports the speed, agility, range and payload 
goals of the FVL program through significant SWAP reductions; will help ensure 
enhanced aircraft-availability by eliminating numerous points of failure; will reduce 
manpower footprint by streamlining field-maintenance and adding an unmanned option 
to nominally manned platforms; will provide a common architecture across manned and 
unmanned variants, facilitating Level-5 interoperability; and its hardware and software 
modularity will help contain costs for maintenance and life-cycle update.   
 If the scope of required attributes and outcomes listed in the program’s ICD is  
scaled back to a degree, other options short of fully-realized second-generation IMA 
might be feasible – but are probably ill-advised in the long-term. While first-generation 
IMA has be a unqualified success in recent commercial aircraft, it has yet to demonstrate 
cost-effectiveness in a multi-mission military platform. Detractors of such IMA-equipped 
aircraft as the F-22, for instance, point out the difficulty in integrating new capabilities 
into closely-coupled systems. IMA2G, which hosts most functions as un-modified 
software instances running in a virtual computing environment has genuine potential to 
combine the SWAP gains of earlier integrated avionics with the modular flexibility of 
federated mission systems. By contrast, the practice of added functionality to a military 
aircraft by installing an endless procession of marginally-integrated black boxes has 
already reached its practical limit. Evidence of this can be seen in the latest AH-64E 
“Guardian” Apaches, and recent block-upgrades to F-16C fighters, which make use of 
localized IMA architectures, grafted onto federated systems in order to deliver additional 
functions without added more LRU’s and unnecessary wiring. Though in theory, the 
same could be done for the FVL, we must question the wisdom of handicapping an entire 
family of aircraft from birth with core avionics design that is already rapidly becoming 
obsolete.  
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B. EMBRACE CHANGE, REDUCE THE RISK 
A better option, in the opinion of this author, is to embrace fully the coming sea-change 
in the way avionics for manned aircraft are designed and implemented. Like all future 
combat vehicles, the FVL will be expected to handle an extremely complex set of 
mission functions; the complexity of the task requires an equally complex suite of 
systems in order to execute it—and the problem we find ourselves in today is that our 
present (document-driven) means of moving such complex systems from concept to 
reality is no longer adequate to the task. 
 Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE), and Modular Open Systems 
Architecture (MOSA) are already painting the way forward. Public-private-sector  
consortiums such as FACE (Future Airborne Capabilities Environment) are pressing 
ahead establishing new industry-wide technical standards to help modular mission 
software finally become a reality; while in Europe, the SCARLETT group (SCAlable and 
Reconfigurable ElecTronic Technology) is channeling government investment into 
model-based testing for the next generation of integrated avionics.  
 In light of the clear immaturity of such technology as deterministic multi-core 
processing and high-assurance virtualization, it is tempting to tread a cautious path with 
the FVL. The entire program must, indeed, find its footing in an acquisition environment 
made pessimistic and hostile by the high-profile struggles of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 
A tepid and hesitant advance rarely makes for effective military strategy on the battlefield 
though, and we suspect that it will do no better within the framework of major military 
systems acquisition.  
 If we allow our pessimism to translate into lukewarm investment in the coming 
revolution in aviation systems design, we will almost surely create a self-fulfilling 
prophesy. Radical improvement does not occur without committed support. Ideas are not 
enough. Ironically, the best way to reduce risk is occasionally to pick the opportune 
moment and charge full-speed ahead. With regard to model-based avionics design, 
testing and validation—the key discipline that will allow us to build a successful IMA2G 
Joint Common Architecture—that time is upon us now.  
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C. RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Though this study of software-defined avionics for the next generation of rotary-
wing military aircraft may have succeeded in answering a few of the questions initially 
posed, the most salient result is probably the list of critical research areas it has 
highlighted. These directions for further study fall into three broad categories:  technical, 
organizational, and operational. 
a. Technical Research Directions 
• Study of candidate Model-Based Systems Engineering methodologies to 
determine which is best-suited for developing military software/hardware 
solutions, including capturing the complexities of human-cyber 
interaction. 
 
• Rigorous testing to verify if current and emerging technology can assure 
deterministic performance in multi-core processing, including in 
installations where one or more cores are deactivated. 
 
• Survey of how advanced deterministic network applications in the 
automotive industry may point the way toward parallel developments in 
military aviation. 
 
• Model the technical requirements that would be needed to create the built-
in tactical simulator concept described in this paper. 
b. Organizational Research Directions 
• Study and develop proposed methods to integrate data-model-based design 
into the military acquisition system, from initial requirements 
development, all the way to operational testing.  
 
• Survey both successful and failed open-source technical standards in the 
IT industry to help determine how best to implement one for military 
avionics. 
c. Operational Research Directions 
• Assess predicted manpower-requirements resulting from optionally-
manned FVL aircraft that provide extended air-service availability to 
theatre commanders.  
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• Identify new mission-sets that the unique characteristics of such aircraft 
might allow in the future. Based on results, determine an ideal force-
structure of FVL variants. 
 
• Study the impact that built-in tactical training simulators would have on 
aircrew readiness. Would they be utilized enough in the deployed 
environment to justify their development?  
 94 
APPENDIX A. DEPLOYABLE INTEGRATED VIRTUAL 
TACTICAL SIMULATOR (DIVTACS) 
In Chapter V of this study, we introduced a proposed concept whereby an 
IMA2G-equipped FVL aircraft could provide deployed aircrews with their own high-
fidelity tactical simulator. We refer to this notional system as DIVTACS, or deployable 
integrated virtual tactical simulator, and illustrate the concept below. 
 
Figure 5.  DIVTACS notional configuration 
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APPENDIX B. TRL DEFINITIONS, DESCRIPTIONS, AND 
SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
TRL Definition Description  Supporting Information 
1 Basic principles 
observed and 
reported. 
Lowest level of technology 
readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into 
applied research and 
development (R&D). Examples 
might include paper studies of a 
technology’s basic properties. 
Published research that 
identifies the principles 
that underlie this 
technology. References to 





Invention begins. Once basic 
principles are observed, 
practical applications can be 
invented. Applications are 
speculative, and there may be 
no proof or detailed analysis to 
support the assumptions. 
Examples are limited to analytic 
studies. 
Publications or other 
references that out- line 
the application being 
considered and that 
provide analysis to 
support the concept. 






Active R&D is initiated. This 
includes analytical studies and 
laboratory studies to physically 
validate the analytical 
predictions of separate elements 
of the technology. Examples 
include components that are not 
yet integrated or representative. 
Results of laboratory tests 
performed to measure 
parameters of interest and 
comparison to analytical 
predictions for critical 
subsystems. References to 
who, where, and when 
these tests and 
comparisons were 
performed. 
4 Component and/or 
breadboard 
validation in a 
laboratory 
environment. 
Basic technological components 
are integrated to establish that 
they will work together. This is 
relatively “low fidelity” 
compared with the eventual 
system. Examples include 
integration of “ad hoc” 
hardware in the laboratory 
System concepts that have 
been considered and 
results from testing 
laboratory scale 
breadboard(s). References 
to who did this work and 
when. Provide an estimate 
of how breadboard 
hardware and test results 
differ from the expected 
system goals. 
5 Component and/or 
breadboard 
Fidelity of breadboard 
technology increases 
Results from testing 
laboratory breadboard 
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TRL Definition Description  Supporting Information 
validation in a 
relevant 
environment. 
significantly. The basic 
technological components are 
integrated with reasonably 
realistic supporting elements so 
they can be tested in a 
simulated environment. 
Examples include “high-
fidelity” laboratory integration 
of components. 
system are integrated with 
other supporting elements 
in a simulated operational 
environment. How does 
the “relevant 
environment” differ from 
the expected operational 
environment? How do the 
test results compare with 
expectations? What 
problems, if any, were 
encountered? Was the 
breadboard system refined 
to more nearly match the 
expected system goals? 
6 System/subsystem 
model or prototype 
demonstration in a 
relevant 
environment. 
Representative model or 
prototype system, which is well 
beyond that of TRL 5, is tested 
in a relevant environment. 
Represents a major step up in a 
technology’s demonstrated 
readiness. Examples include 
testing a prototype in a high-
fidelity laboratory environment 
or in a simulated operational 
environment. 
Results from laboratory 
testing of a proto- type 
system that is near the 
desired con- figuration in 
terms of performance, 
weight, and volume. How 
did the test environment 
differ from the operational 
environment? Who 
performed the tests? How 
did the test compare with 
expectations? What 
problems, if any, were 
encountered? What 
are/were the plans, 
options, or actions to 
resolve problems before 
moving to the next level? 
7 System prototype 
demonstration in an 
operational 
environment 
Prototype near or at planned 
operational system. Represents 
a major step up from TRL 6 by 
requiring demonstration of an 
actual system prototype in an 
operational environment (e.g., 
in an aircraft, in a vehicle, or in 
space). 
Results from testing a 
prototype system in an 
operational environment. 
Who performed the tests? 
How did the test compare 
with expectations? What 
problems, if any, were 
encountered? What 
are/were the plans, 
options, or actions to 
resolve problems before 
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TRL Definition Description  Supporting Information 
moving to the next level? 





Technology has been proven to 
work in its final form and under 
expected conditions. In almost 
all cases, this TRL represents 
the end of true system 
development. Examples include 
developmental test and 
evaluation (DT&E) of the 
system in its intended weapon 
system to deter- mine if it meets 
design specifications. 
Results of testing the 
system in its final 
configuration under the 
expected range of 
environmental conditions 
in which it will be 
expected to operate. 
Assessment of whether it 
will meet its operational 
requirements. What 
problems, if any, were 
encountered? What 
are/were the plans, 
options, or actions to 
resolve problems before 
finalizing the design? 




Actual application of the 
technology in its final form and 
under mission conditions, such 
as those encountered in 
operational test and evaluation 
(OT&E). Examples include 
using the system under 










APPENDIX C. CURRENT AND EMERGING STANDARDS IN 
AVIONICS  
 
ARINC 429; Mark 33 Digital Information Transfer System (DITS).   




ARINC 629; Multi-Transmitter Data Bus.  




ARINC 653; Avionics Application Software Standard Interface.  




ARINC 664/AFDX; Aircraft Data Network.  




MIL-STD-1553; Military Standard: Aircraft Internal Time Division Command/Response 
Multiplex Data Bus.   
Multiple resources can be found at: http://www.milstd1553.com/ 




MIL-STD-1773; Military Standard: Fiber Optics Mechanization of an Aircraft Internal 
Time Division Command Response Multiplex Data Bus.   
PDF copy available for download at: 
http://everyspec.com/MIL-STD/MIL-STD-1700-1799/MIL-STD-1773_25257 
 
IEEE 1394; IEEE Standard for a High Performance Serial Bus.   
Current (2008) version available at:  
http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/1394-2008.html 
 
AS6802; Deterministic Ethernet and Unified Networking.   
PDF copy available (for a fee) at:  http://standards.sae.org/as6802/  
 
FACE Technical Standard; Future Airborne Capability Environment Technical Standard. 
Current (2.1) version available at: http://www.opengroup.org/face/tech-standard-2.1 
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